Bargaining Chains (Long Version) by Lovejoy, William S.
 


































http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621867   
Bargaining Chains (Long Version) May 24, 2010




2. The Balanced Principal BP solution 10
3. Relationship of the BP solution to theories
of bargaining and cooperative games 16
4. Bargaining experiments and intuition 23
5. Managerial consequences 27
6. Multi-echelon bargaining chains 32
7. Asymmetric information 49
8. Other supply chain contexts 53
9. Conclusions 57
References 58
Appendix: Proofs of propositions 62
Figures 74
1. Introduction
A supply chain is a series of value adding activities performed by independent firms that
sequentially transform raw materials into finished goods. The total profit potential in
the chain is the difference between the revenues generated by the finished product and
the costs (upstream raw material costs plus value-adding costs) along the chain. Transfer
prices for inputs serve to distribute this profit among the firms in the chain. Each firm
tries to negotiate these prices to be awarded the business and also get as much as possible
of the chain-wide profit. The conditions of trade along the chain are negotiated among the
actors in the chain, each recognizing that together they can generate positive profits but
each also wanting the largest share of that profit for themselves.
Scholarly analyses of supply chains focus on issues of efficiency (are chain-wide profits
maximized by the choices made by the independent firms?) and distribution (how are the
chain-wide profits distributed along the chain?). The former is important from a social
perspective (are resources appropriately allocated?) and the latter is important from a
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firm perspective (understanding the profitability consequences of alternative actions is
necessary to advise managers).
Despite the voluminous supply chain literature there remain some common and important
supply chain contexts for which no efficiency/distribution predictions are currently avail-
able. This paper fills that void in one such setting. Specifically, we consider a firm that
designs a new product and wishes to bring it to market, but does not have ownership or
control over all of the resources required to make that happen. We assume the product is
sufficiently differentiated from current offerings in non-price attributes that the designing
firm is, at least temporarily, a monopolist in the market. The firm must select and contract
with one of several possible tier 1 suppliers for necessary inputs, who do the same with
their (tier 2) suppliers, etc. In the tiers of the supply chain closer to the monopolist and
the finished goods market the required inputs are product-specific and, due to fixed tool-
ing and/or relationship costs, a single supplier in each tier will emerge as active. At some
point moving upstream in the supply chain the inputs become substitutable commodities
and multiple suppliers may be active, delivering standardized inputs at market competitive
prices. This general situation can be found in a range of industries including high tech,
consumer products and services, family and entertainment, food, furniture, b-to-b services,
automotive and large complex engineered products.
In practice the tier 0 monopolist will request quotes from several (typically two to five, with
three a common number) tier 1 suppliers on their approved vendor list (AVL). Suppliers
on the AVL have already been vetted for financial viability, quality systems, capacity and
other characteristics important to supply performance. The tier 1 suppliers negotiate with
approved tier 2 suppliers in the same way, before returning a quote to the monopolist. If
the tier 1 quotes are uniformly unsatisfactory another round of negotiations can ensue. So,
tier 2 suppliers compete with each other to supply tier 1 suppliers, who compete for the
contract from the monopolist.
We model this situation using a monopolist and two product-specific tiers prior to the
commodity stage. An example is shown in Figure 1a, where the tier 0 monopolist can
choose one of four possible tier 1 suppliers, each tier 1 supplier can work with one of 3
possible tier 2 suppliers, and each of the tier 2 suppliers can purchase commodity inputs
at the market price. When negotiations close, exactly one tier 1 and one tier 2 supplier
will be active (Figure 1b). The tier 2 supplier may be purchasing from one or multiple
sources, but this does not matter since inputs are standard and available at a constant
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market price. Model inputs are the market value for finished goods, the value adding costs
in each firm, the commodity prices, and the number of competing firms in each tier. When
referring to the nonfinancial structure of the chain, we will call a configuration with m
firms in tier 2 and n in tier 1 an m × n supply chain, so Figure 1 shows a 3 × 4 supply
chain.
Our model assumptions include tier-by-tier negotiations, horizontal competitition, sole
supply in tiers 1 and 2, and complete local information. The assumption of tier-wise nego-
tiations is consistent with practice in many real supply chains. Interestingly, despite some
recently publicized product failures traced to inappropriate behaviors at upper tier sup-
pliers, many companies still have only limited visibility beyond their immediate neighbors
in the chain. The assumption of horizontal competition is that firms in each tier compete
uncooperatively with each other to take the contract. So, we do not model purchasing
groups or other means by which firms in one tier cooperate with each other. Were we to
assert the existence (and persistence) of a purchasing (buying) group, we could predict the
profit flowing into the group by considering it a single actor (firm) in our model with a
cost structure driven by its most efficient internal organization. However, we do not pursue
that explicitly.
The emergence of a single active supplier-buyer pair in each tier will be a natural economic
outcome with significant economies of scale, such as significant fixed tooling or transaction
costs to set up a supply relationship. Researchers and practitioners are divided on the
relative merits of sole versus multiple sourcing (c.f. Elmaghraby 2000, Larson and Kul-
chitsky 1998, Richardson and Roumasset 1995 and references there). In practice and in
the literature this decision can depend on many factors, including the uniqueness of the
required technology and whether or not the supplier has to develop it in total or in part,
problems in exactly replicating tooling, capacity issues, the potential for cost reductions
through learning-by-doing, adoption of a lean versus more traditional supply philosophy,
issues of hedging supply uncertainty, the presence of future opportunities to recontract,
and other relationship-specific investments or context-specific characteristics. A common
current practice is “parallel sourcing” where there is one supplier for a specific product, but
another supplier of the same basic process for another product. For example, a computer
manufacturer may sole-source enclosures for product A, due to the difficulty of exactly
replicating an injection molding tool and problems of consistency with multiple vendors.
However, they will sole-source enclosures for product B from an alternative supplier, so
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while there is a single supplier in any one product’s supply chain, the manufacturer main-
tains diversified access to the injection molding process by working with different vendors
for different products. The sole vendor for enclosures for product A will contract with
a supplier for the injection molding tool, who may design the tool but then subcontract
its machining. Each stage of the chain for product A will be occupied by a single firm,
chosen among a potentially large set of potential participants, until inputs become more
standardized (e.g. steel). Another business practice is to have different supply chains for
different geographic regions, with sole sourcing in each. So, there may be two enclosure
suppliers, but only one in the North American supply chain and one in the Asian supply
chain.
The assumption of complete local information means that the costs and values for all firms
in negotiations between two tiers in the chain are common knowledge. This is clearly an
abstraction in many applied settings, but is not unrealistic in others and also provides
a starting point for more intricate analysis of bargaining with incomplete information.
Information is power in negotiations, and firms go to great lengths to figure out what
things should cost. In practice these efforts include reverse engineering, cost modeling
based on historical data, backing out component costs from competitors’ published prices
for different product configurations, direct inspection of suppliers, open books agreements,
and other tactics.
In summary, we analyze the efficiency and distributional outcomes in m×n supply chains
characterized by tier-wise negotiations, horizontal competition, sole-sourcing and complete
local information. No solution concept yet exists in the literature for this context, yet it is
a reasonable representation of many real supply chains. It is apparent that central to the
solution will be the outcome of the negotiations among the m + n firms in tiers 1 and 2.
Small numbers bargaining is one of the enduringly difficult economic settings, indeed early
economists including Edgeworth (1881), Marshall (1890) and Bowley (1928) all viewed the
outcomes of such negotiations as indeterminate in both price and quantity, since there are
many different outcomes that can support (what would later be called) a Nash equilibrium.
However, there is a substantial bargaining literature that provides predictions in special
cases of our supply chain problem (such as bilateral monopoly), some of which have been
experimentally validated. A salient feature of bargaining between two parties is that
the consent of both is required for closure, so even selfish players will realize that some
cooperation is required for anybody to benefit. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
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bargaining literature intersects that for cooperative games. Neither of these, however,
has a strong presence in the supply chain literature, despite the intuitive appeal of the
bargaining approach for many real b-to-b negotiations.
Nagarajan and Sosic (2008) review bargaining and cooperative game applications in supply
chains, attesting to their scarcity and cataloging within that small set the prevalence of
systems with a single firm in at least one tier (1 × 1, 1 × n, or m × 1 models). These
include a series of papers on assembly models in which a monopolist buyer negotiates with
each of several suppliers, all of which are required to assemble a finished product (c.f.
Granot and Yin 2008, Nagarajan and Bassok 2008, Nagarajan and Sosic 2009). This gives
each supplier veto power over any production, which is a different scenario than the one
analyzed here, and would suggest a different solution method (for example, Shapely values
may be more relevant in an assembly context than they are here, as discussed in section
8). Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, chapter 6) analyze sequential bargaining models of
exchange between two tiers of symmetrical buyers and suppliers, with random matching
among them. Horizontal competition comes not from differential costs, but from the fear
of not being matched, which is driven by the relative number of symmetric firms in each
tier.
Bargaining models with complete information generally assume that efficient outcomes will
prevail, for reasons discussed more completely in section 4. Although few in number, most
papers at the bargaining - supply chain interface agree that a bargaining chain will reach
the efficient level of output, and that the negotiations are really over the distribution of
the maximal surplus (c.f. Kohli and Park 1989, Ertogral and Wu 2001, Gurnani and Shi
2006). See Cachon and Netessine (2004) for additional references to the use of cooperative
game theory in supply chain settings. To date no results exist for the m×n supply chains
addressed here.
We develop an intuitive understanding of the model using the 3× 4 supply chain shown in
Figure 2a as an illustrative example, fixing quantity (at one unit) for transparency. The
tier 0 monopolist wishes to market a single unit of a product she developed, but will need
to subcontract some value-adding activities. Given inputs from tier 1, the monopolist can
make $16 (the net of the market price and her own value adding costs), so her net profit
will be $16 minus the price she must pay for inputs from tier 1. Any firm in tier 2 can
source commodity inputs for $1. The value adding costs to produce one unit for each firm
in tiers 1 and 2 are indicated by the numbers in the boxes. The final chain will include the
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monopolist and exactly one tier 1 and one tier 2 supplier (plus commodity suppliers). We
wish to anticipate which firms will end up being active in the supply chain, and at what
negotiated transfer prices they will do business. We focus on bargaining between tiers 1
and 2, and call firms in tier 1 the “buying” firms, who buy from the “supplying” firms in
tier 2. Let bi denote the ith buying firm (counting from the top in Figure 2a), and sj the
jth supplier in tier 2. Which firms will end up with the contract and at what price?
Figure 2b shows a possible contract configuration, with the monopolist buying inputs
from b2 for $15 and b2 buying from s2 for $9. The total social surplus available using this
chain is $3 ($16 minus the value-adding costs of $13), which is shared equally among the
monopolist, b2 and s2 (both make $1 profit). Is this a candidate for a solution to this
3× 4 bargaining problem? Myopic (that is, looking only at the near-term consequences of
one’s actions) conditions for stability would include the condition that no disenfranchised
supplier (in Figure 2b, suppliers other than s2) be able to make a more attractive offer to
buyer b2, thereby winning the supply contract. We model this aspect of the process by
the firms in tier 2 simultaneously and uncooperatively making offers to b2, and b2 choosing
rationally among these offers. This problem is tractable using familiar non-cooperative
theory. Below we will call this problem S→2 denoting the supplier tier making competitive
offers to buyer 2 in an attempt to win the supply contract. No supply chain configuration
involving supplying firm j and buying firm i is myopically stable unless firm j is an element
of the solution to problem S→i. In this specific example, s1 would be the unique winner in
problem S→2 at an offered supply price of $8 (the details will be worked out below). This
is shown in Figure 2c.
But, firms in tier 1 are also in competition with each other for the contract from the
monopolist. A condition for myopic stability of an sj -bi chain would be that no other
buying firm i′ = i be able to simultaneously make a better offer to supplier sj and to
the monopolist. In our example (Figure 2c) the stability of the s1-b2 chain would be in
jeapardy if any buyer i′ = 2 could, assuming revenues of $15, outbid all other buyers for the
services of supplier 1 and remain stictly profitable. This is because a successful firm in that
bidding process that retains positive profits can secure supply from s1, take the contract
with the monopolist from b2 by offering to sell to the monopolist for an infinitesimal
amount below $15, while being strictly better off relative to remaining disenfranchised.
We test the stability of an sj-bi chain by analyzing the buying (tier 1) firms (computing
their valuations for the contract using the monopolist’s current price) simultaneously and
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uncooperatively making offers to sj , a problem we denote by B→j . Any buyer not selected
by supplier j in problem B→j cannot be in a myopically stable supply chain configuration
that involves supplier sj . In our specific example starting from Figure 2c, b1 values the
contract at $13 ($15 revenues - $2 value adding costs), b2 values it at $10, b3 at $9 and b4 at
$7. Buyer b1 realizes that the most any competing buyer can afford to pay is $10 for inputs
from tier 2. So, b1 can offer to pay s1 $10 for supply (which s1 readily accepts), and still
have enough remaining surplus to offer to supply the monopolist for less than $15, which
the monopolist also accepts. This leaves b1 sourcing from s1 at a price of $10, as shown in
Figure 2d. In this specific example, b1 would be the unique winner in problem B→1 at a
price of $10 (again, details below), and would take the contract with the monopolist from
b2 by undercutting the current $15 price by the smallest amount possible, technically an
infinitesimal.
Following this logic, an sj-bi supply chain is not myopically stable unless sj is in the solution
to S→i and bi is in the solution to B→j . In this example, where we hypothesize that firms
s1 and b1 will emerge from negotiations, we need to check that b1 solves B→1, which it
does at a supply price of $10, and that s1 solves S→1, which it does at a supply price of
$8. It remains to predict a supply price between the two. We claim that a reasonable
expectation will be $9, one half way between these two solutions. We defend this further
below.
Note that in problem S→i we let the supplier tier make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer
to the buyer, granting them what is commonly known as “principal” status to make an
offer to an “agent” who can only accept or reject the offer. In problem B→j we grant
the buying tier principal status. Each of the subproblems (S→i and B→j) is a common
agency problem (c.f. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) with complete information that is
tractable using standard non-cooperative machinery. We then combine these two to get
the predicted supply price. We call this the Balanced Principal (denoted BP) solution,
because it takes two symmetrical principal’s problems and compromises between them.
The BP solution to an m × n supply chain bargaining problem predicts which two firms
will emerge with the contract, and what the transfer price between them will be. As will
be shown below, the most efficient two firms will be the contracting pair because they can
beat any other bid and remain profitable. In Figure 2 the high value buyer and the low
cost supplier (the first firms in each tier) will emerge as winners. Once these firms are
selected, the BP solution predicts a transfer price in between the solution prices to the two
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non-cooperative subproblems, which are themselves driven by the horizontal competition
in each tier. It will be shown below that this price prediction is an extension of classical
bilateral bargaining theory, in that it collapses to the classical solution when the latter is
applicable.
Figure 3 shows the supplier-buyer tiers as in Figure 2 but in a more compact way. Here,
the numbers alongside the buying firms indicate the value to them for having the contract
at $15 from the monopolist, so these equal $15 minus their value adding costs. The figures
beside the suppliers indicate their total cost of supply, which is the commodity price plus
their value-adding cost. Figure 3c shows, in this condensed form, the BP solution to the
3 × 4 supply chain from Figure 2 featuring the transfer price of $9.
Figure 3a shows another cost structure and its BP solution. Here, no other firms beside s1
and b1 can form a viable chain (no other buyer can profitably contract with any supplier,
and no other supplier can profitably contract with any other buyer) so we essentially have
a bilateral monopoly. In this case the BP solution will identify these two firms as the active
pair and predict a transfer price that is the same as the Nash bargaining solution where
the available surplus ($9) is divided equally between the two firms (each makes a profit of
$4.5). So the BP prediction is a natural one, and consistent with a well-known solution
concept in this special case. In Figure 3b supplier s2 can profitably contract with buyer b1
but not with b2, and likewise buyer b2 can profitably contract with supplier s1 but not with
s2. Although s2 and b2 are strategic players in the game, they are silenced by any price
between $5 and $9. Any price outside that range will activate them, as they are tempted
to jump in and take the contract. Intuitively b1can negotiate as if she has a credible
alternative that will supply for $9 and s1 can negotiate as if he has a credible alternative
that will pay $5. This is similar to bilateral bargaining models with disagreement values
(outside options), a situation in which existing bargaining theory has something to say (c.f.
Muthoo 1999). Any price between $5 and $9 will freeze out the competition and can be
credible as a solution. Resolving this indeterminacy by choosing a price in the middle has
appeal, and coincides with the classical Nash bargaining solution for bilateral negotiations
with the stated outside options.
Figure 3c represents the most complicated case. The BP solution is for s1 and b1 to end
up with the contract, at a transfer price of $9 between them. That the efficient pair will
end up with the contract is intuitively satisfying, but at a supply price of $9 firm s2 is
tempted to offer to supply b1 for $8.5 and take the supply contract from s1, and likewise
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firm b2 is tempted to offer to pay s1 $9.5 for supply, which would also disrupt the stability.
In contrast to the situation in Figure 3b, no offer can freeze out the second best firms
who will be tempted to jump into the negotiations. Such an offer would have to be at
least $10 but at most $8, which is infeasible. In contrast with the situation in Figure
3b, in this case the second best supplier and buyer are not at the mercy of the efficient
firms, because they can plausibly contract with each other and hence can act stragically
and cannot be treated as passive outside options to the efficient firms. Classical bilateral
bargaining theory does not address this situation. However, we will see below that the BP
solution still maximizes the bilateral Nash social welfare function, albeit without satisfying
conventional constraints on the outside option values. We will also see that whenever the
second best firms can profitably contract, no solution is myopically stable (some firm will
always have an incentive to make a better offer rather than lie idle), but that any disruption
from the BP solution can initiate a series of offers and counteroffers that do not benefit
the disrupting firm. Hence, the BP solution enjoys a form of far-sighted stability familiar
in cooperative games.
Finally, we reveal a conceit in the example in Figure 3c. Since the firms in tier 1 compete
for business from the monopolist, the raw data shown in Figure 3c are not sustainable.
Recall that the valuations shown there come from a $15 price from the monopolist and the
value-adding costs for each firm (as shown in Figure 2). Consider s1-b1 as the active firms.
Firm b2 could offer to pay firm s2 $9 for supply (readily accepted) and offer to supply
the tier 0 monopolist for $14.50, taking the contract and retaining $.50 profit for herself.
The efficient pair s1-b1 will be able to match any bid from any competing pair and remain
profitable, but will not be able to sustain revenues from the monopolist in excess of the
total supply cost of any alternative chain disjoint from both s1 and b1. In this example, the
monopolist need pay no more than $13 for supply, and at that supply price no alternative
chain (other than s1-b1) can be profitable. That is, we would never see the situation in
Figure 3c where s2 has the option to profitably work with b2. So, another feature of a
bargaining chain solution with a monopolist in tier 0 is that whatever chain ends up with
the contract, the transfer from the monopolist is sufficiently low that no alternative disjoint
chain can be strictly profitable. We will see below that for constant quantity problems,
where only price is being negotiated, appeals to concepts of far-sighted stability are not
necessary to justify the BP price, which will reduce to classical Nash bargaining transfers
between the active pair of firms. However, this will not remain true when both quantity
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and price are under negotiation.
We do not consider changes in the demands of the monopolist further, assuming rather that
whatever the revenue potential between tiers 1 and 0 are, this reality is correctly reflected
in the buyers’ (tier 1) valuations for having the contract. Only as needed will we invoke the
constraints put on those valuations that bargaining with a self-interested monopolist will
imply that no chain disjoint from an efficient pair can be profitable. For now, we consider
general m×n bargaining chains with arbitrary valuations for buyers and costs for suppliers.
By solving the general case, we clearly inform the more constrained one. The purpose of
this paper is to propose a solution concept for such general m × n bargaining chains, to
justify the proposed solution concept using appeals to classical theories in bargaining and
cooperative games (and experimental evidence when it exists), and to investigate some
of the consequences of the solution for supply chain managers. We present the formal
development next.
2. The balanced principal (BP) solution
Here we describe the balanced principal solution in more detail and greater generality,
considering both price and quantity. As noted we combine two tractable leadership models,
one for each tier in the supply chain. In problem S→i, firms in the supplying tier make
simultaneous competitive price-quantity offers to a single buying firm i. Let S∗i denote the
set of preferred suppliers in problem S→i, meaning that after considering all of the bids
buyer i strictly prefers any supplier in S∗i to any firm outside that set, and is indifferent
between any two firms in S∗i . Likewise, in problem B→j the buying tier makes offers to a
single supplier j, and we define B∗j to be the set of preferred buyers selected by supplier
j. We define a “balanced principal” (BP) solution to the m × n bargaining problem to
be a designated active supplier j∗ and active buyer i∗, and a transfer price and quantity
between them that satisfy the following:
1) i∗ ∈ B∗j∗
2) j∗ ∈ S∗i∗
3) The quantity q∗ simultaneously solves both B→j∗ and S→i∗
4) The profit to buyer i∗ and supplier j∗ is in the middle of what each would get in problems
S→i∗ and B→j∗ .
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The BP solution has intuitive appeal because the combined subproblems are reasonable
representations of what suppliers (buyers) face when trying to bid the contract away from
the active supplier (buyer). Next we will analyze the two subproblems in detail, and
comment on their synthesis.
Consider an m×n supply chain stage as shown in Figure 4. Buyer i has capacity Qi ≤ ∞
and a net value (revenues minus value-added costs) for quantity q (0 ≤ q ≤ Qi) given by
the function ri(q). Supplier j has capacity Qj ≤ ∞ and can supply quantity 0 ≤ q ≤ Qj
at total cost (purchase price for inputs plus value adding cost) of cj(q). Let Qij denote
the minimum of Qi and Qj . If buyer i and supplier j contract to do business, they can
generate chain profits as high as





We assume this is finite unless ri(q) − cj(q) < 0 for all 0 ≤ q ≤ Qij in which case supplier
j is not a viable partner for buyer i and we define πMij = −∞. For viable pairs we assume
enough regularity in cj and ri so that any profit between 0 and πMij is available (continuity
with ri(0) − cj(0) = 0 will suffice). In natural fashion we define πMi = maxj{πMij },
πMj = maxi{πMij }, and πM = maxi,j{πMij }. Note that πM is the maximal possible chain-
wide surplus, and we assume that πM ≥ 0 because otherwise there would be no viable
supplier-buyer pairs and no contract would be signed.
Problem S→i: Suppliers facing buyer i
Consider the situation in Figure 4 but with only one buyer, so m suppliers face one buyer.
Problem S→i denotes the problem where the sole buyer is buyer i. Intuitively, buyer i has
the contract from downstream and the suppliers are bidding against each other to partner
with buyer i.
Define E = {j|πMij = πMi }, the set of “efficient” suppliers in that they can generate maximal
profits for the chain in partnership with buyer i. Define πM2s to be the profit potential via
the second best supplier, πM2s = max {πMik | ∃j ∈ E such that j = k}. The way we define
this, if there are multiple efficient suppliers (E has more than one firm in it) πM2s = πMi ,
but if E is a singleton πM2s < π
M
i . If there is only one viable firm with π
M
ij ≥ 0 then E is
a singleton and πM2s = −∞.
In problem S→i the suppliers make proposals (simultaneously and in competition) to which
buyer i responds by choosing the best among the offers. If supplier j offers to supply
11
quantity qij in exchange for a transfer of pij and the buyer accepts, then the buyer’s profit
will be πbij = ri(qij) − pij and supplier j’s profit will be πsij = pij − cj(qij). Note the
price is for the transfer of qij units and is not restricted to be linear in quantity. We
will do the analysis in terms of the proposed profits to each partner, (πsij , π
b
ij). A profit
proposal is feasible if πsij ≥ 0, πbij ≥ 0, and (πsij + πbij) ≤ πMij , in which case there will exist
a price and quantity pair that attains the proposed profits to each player. With general
cost and revenue functions there may be more than one price and quantity compatible
with a profit proposal, however we will assume that for each supplier-buyer pair there is a
unique quantity that attains their maximal possible profit. This will be true, for example,
if ri − cj is strictly quasi-concave, or is monotone with finite Qij , but also under more
general conditions.
To avoid needless complexity we will make some assumptions that eliminate indifference
sets for the actors, reducing notation and increasing transparency at no intuitive cost.
We assume that if a supplier is indifferent among a set of bids, he will bid aggressively,
maximizing πbij on the set. If the buyer has multiple maximal offers (0 ≤ πbik = πbij are
both maximal and k = j) we assume that she will award the contract to the supplier
with the greatest social efficiency (greatest πMij ; if there are multiple numbers of these
she breaks the tie randomly). This recognizes the fact that a firm with more surplus
to work with can always best any competing bid. For example, suppose the maximal
possible surplus between supplier 3 and buyer 1 equals 100, and all other suppliers bid
their maximal surplus which is 85. Supplier 3 can beat 85 by an infinitesimal amount
and get the contract, sill retaining 15 (minus an infitesimal amount) for himself. Rather
than dealing with infinitesimals and limiting arguments, we just say he bids 85 and gets
the contract. Operationally, the assumption that the contract goes to the highest bidding
firm, breaking ties using relative social surplus, accomplishes this.
Buyer i’s decision is δij , the probability that she awards the supply contract to supplier
j. So, δij = 1 if supplier j offers the uniquely maximal πbij . If there are multiple suppliers
with equal offers then she chooses the one with maximal social surplus. If there are K > 1
of these, then δij = δik = ... = 1/K for each of them.
The suppliers face the buyer’s δ function and have to simultaneously make proposals πbij to
the buyer. For any supplier j let (π)−j denote the proposals πbik by all other firms k = j.
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over all feasible offers πsij ≥ 0, πbij ≥ 0, πsij + πbij ≤ πMij . That is, each supplier submits a
bid that maximizes his profit, after considering the probability that his bid will suffice to
win the contract. The solution to this problem is characterized in the next proposition.
Proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 1: An equilibrium in the suppliers’ problem S→i will exist and all equilibria
will share the following attributes (j∗ denotes the selected supplier):
a) All suppliers j will bid πbij = (π
M
ij ∧ πM2s ) ∨ 0 and in particular πbij∗ = (0 ∨ πM2s ).
b) The buyer will choose an efficient supplier, j∗ ∈ E.











d) The contracted price and quantity are unique.
In Proposition 1, parts (b) and (c) imply that in equilibrium the buyer will always choose
an efficient supplier and they will contract on the efficient quantity. Part (a) implies that
the profits to the buyer depend on the competitiveness of firms left out of the contract,
as one would expect. If there is only one viable supplier (πM2s < 0) he can extract all
the rent (πbij∗ = 0), as is natural given his principal’s powers. However, with supplier
competition the active supplier’s profit is limited to the difference between the total chain
profit potential with him as supplier and the next best alternative supplier. This is because
at any higher supplier’s profit level the next best supplier would jump in and steal the
contract, so the winning supplier must price low enough to keep the competition at bay.
If two or more suppliers have maximal profit potential (so |E| > 1 and πM2s = πMi ) they
compete their profits away and the buyer gets all the rent. All of these results are natural
ones given multiple suppliers competitively bidding for a contract from a monopolist buyer.
The solution of problem S→i takes on a particularly simple form when the quantity (q) is
fixed. In that case, let ri denote ri(q) and cj denote cj(q) and without loss of generality
assume these are ordered so that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cm (c.f. Figure 5). The S→i solution is
for an efficient supplier to get the contract at a transfer price of p = (ri ∧ c2). To see this,
note that πMi = ri − c1 (which we assume is non-negative or else no supplier can pair with
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buyer i) and πM2s = ri − c2. Proposition 1 says that all suppliers j will offer profits to
buyer i equal to (ri − cj) ∧ (ri − c2) ∨ 0. If c1 < c2, so E = {1}, supplier 1 will win the
contract with a bid of (ri − c2) ∨ 0. If there are multiple efficient suppliers (c1 = c2) then
one of them will win, but again the winning bid is (ri − c2) ∨ 0. So, in problem S→i with
quantity fixed an efficient supplier will get the contract at price ri− (ri−c2)∨0 = (ri∧c2).
Problem B→j: Multiple buyers bidding for supply from supplier j
Problem B→j is symmetrical to problem S→i. In B→j the n buyers bid for the contract
from the sole supplier j. Define πMij and π
M
j analogously to the suppliers’ problem and we
assume that πMj ≥ 0 otherwise there would be no viable pairing and no contract would be
signed. We again assume enough regularity in the ri and cj functions to work in the space of
proposed profit divisions between buyer i and supplier j that sum to a value on the interval
[0, πMij ]. E = {i|πMij = πMj } is the set of efficient buyers and πM2b is the profit potential via
the second best buyer, that is πM2b = max {πMjk | ∃i ∈ E such that i = k}. As before, if
E has more than one firm in it πM2b = π
M




j . If there is
only one viable buyer with πMj ≥ 0 then E is a singleton and we define πM2b = −∞. We
make assumptions symmetrical to problem S→i to break ties in indifference regions and
avoid needless complexity.
Supplier j’s decision is δij , the probability that he awards the supply contract to buyer
i. From the above assumptions and the buyer’s self-interest, δij = 1 if buyer i offers the
uniquely maximal πsij ≥ 0 or if buyer i ties with other firms but among these has a uniquely
maximal πMij . If, on the other hand, there are K > 1 suppliers who maximally tie on both
of these dimensions then δ = 1/K for each of them. The proof of the following proposition
is symmetrical to that for Proposition 1, and is omitted.
Proposition 2: An equilibrium in the buyers’ problem B→j will exist and all equilibria
will share the following attributes (i∗ denotes the selected buyer):
a) All buyers i will bid πsij = (π
M
ij ∧ πM2b ) ∨ 0 so in particular πsi∗j = (πM2b ∨ 0).
b) The supplier will choose an efficient buyer, i∗ ∈ E.










d) The contracted price and quantity are unique.
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Again, if there is only one viable buyer she can extract all the rent. However, with buyer
competition the active buyer’s profit is limited to the difference between the total chain
profit potential with her as buyer and the next best alternative. In particular, if two or
more buyers have maximal profit potential (|E| > 1) they compete their profits away.
Again, if quantity is fixed the solution to B→j takes on a particularly simple form. An
argument similar to that for the suppliers’ problem shows that an efficient buyer will get
the contract at a transfer price of (r2 ∨ cj).
The Balanced Principal solution
The BP solution is defined by (1) through (4) above. Intuitively, (1) and (2) say that
supplier j∗ is a winner in the competition for the contract with i∗, and vice versa. Hence
i∗ and j∗ (an efficient pair) form a natural pairing in that they would choose each other
among all suitors in the two subproblems. Part (3), that the quantity must solve both
subproblems simultaneously, comes without cost since all bidders rationally bid at their
efficient quantity. This is also intuitive based on classical logic: from any inefficient quantity
a bidder is better off proposing an efficient quantity and capturing the extra surplus. The
profit distribution in part (4) is halfway between the profits generated in the two leadership
problems S→i∗ and B→j∗ , as discussed above. That is, the predicted profit to the (efficient)
buyer is
πbi∗j∗ = .5{(0 ∨ πM2s ) + πM − (0 ∨ πM2b }
and the profit to the (efficient) supplier is
πsi∗j∗ = .5{πM − (0 ∨ πM2s ) + (0 ∨ πM2b }.
Both of these are non-negative since πM2b ≤ πM and πM2s ≤ πM , and they sum to πM
so profits are zero for all inactive firms. There can be multiple BP solutions (all efficient,
consider for example the perfectly symmetrical case where all suppliers and all buyers
have identical cost structures), in which case we assume that the active pair will be chosen
randomly among the efficient set.
Again, if quantity is fixed the BP solution is simply stated: An efficient supplier-buyer
pair will get the contract at transfer price equal to
p = .5
{




So far, the BP solution is a proposal for solutions to m×n bargaining chains with complete
information, where a single contract will be signed, based on the logic of competitors in
each tier trying to bid the contract away from an incumbent pair, and the semi-balanced
power inherent in bargaining situations. We now justify this solution with appeals to
existing solution concepts in bargaining theory and cooperative games. While there is no
consensus on what constitutes a solution to multi-party bargaining problems, there are
well-studied alternatives and partial results for special cases. As shown in the next two
sections the BP solution always maximizes the Nash social welfare function and reduces
to classical Nash bargaining when m = n = 1 and in special cases when m,n > 1. The
BP solution is also in the core (if it exists) of an m + n person cooperative game defined
using an appropriate characteristic value; and is a member of a solution set as defined
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). However, the BP solution is not consistent
with the notion of Shapely values (Shapely 1953), which implicitly grants more power to
uncompetitive firms than is allowed by the balanced principal approach, or by intuition in
this setting.
3. Relationship of the BP solution to theories of bargaining and cooperative
games
The bargaining literature is dominated by models of bilateral monopoly (m = n = 1). In
a classic paper, John Nash (1950) proposed a set of axioms for 2-person bargaining that
imply that the parties will reach a solution that maximizes the social welfare function
(πs − ds)(πb − db) where πs and πb are the profits to the supplier and buyer, respectively,
and ds and db are their profits if negotiations break down (their disagreement payoffs).
The extension of the Nash social welfare function to more than two parties, as would be
required with horizontal competition, is not often used in a supply chain context because
it gives each player veto power. That is, the generalized Nash social welfare function
is the product Πm+ni=1 (πi − di) where di is actor i’s disagreement value, so a single actor
defecting to her disagreement value implies zero social welfare. This is not a natural model
in many contexts, including supply chains where uncompetitive firms can be frozen out of
the negotiations and have no veto power over competitive firms who are free to contract
without them. However, bilateral bargaining models can include some aspects of horizontal
competition through the inclusion of appropriate disagreement payoffs. Assuming that an
efficient supplier-buyer pair has the contract and is negotiating about how to divide the
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surplus πM , it is natural to set the disagreement payoff for the buyer at (πM2s ∨ 0) because
she can threaten to approach the second best (but currently disenfranchised) supplier with
an acceptable offer. Likewise, a natural disagreement payoff for the efficient supplier would
be (πM2b ∨ 0).
It is uniformly assumed in the bilateral bargaining literature that the sum of the disagree-
ment payoffs cannot exceed the maximal social surplus, represented in this context by
(πM2b ∨ 0) + (πM2s ∨ 0) ≤ πM . The justification is that if this is violated then regardless of
how the social surplus is divided between the two firms, at least one firm must receive less
than its default value, and this is not rational. However, in m × n bargaining chains with
disagreement payoffs as just described, the default inequality does not have to hold. In
fact, it would be impossible for the chain with an efficient buyer and second best supplier
and the chain with an efficient supplier and second best buyer to be simultaneously active
and earn their disagreement payoffs (πM2s and πM2b , respectively), since only one pair can
be under contract. That is, in m × n bargaining chains the feasible set of profit outcomes
to the two efficient firms is larger than the set assumed in the bilateral bargaining litera-
ture. When we relax this constraint, we find that the BP division of profits maximizes the
bilateral Nash social welfare function with the stated disagreement payoffs.
Proposition 3: The division of the surplus πM between an efficient buyer and supplier in
the BP solution maximizes the unconstrained bilateral Nash social welfare function with
supplier disagreement payoff ds = (0∨πM2b ) and buyer disagreement payoff db = (0∨πM2s ).
That is, the profit to the supplier, πs, will maximize (πs −ds)(πM −πs −db) and the profit
to the buyer will be πM − πs.
Essentially, Proposition 3 says that it is appropriate to extend Nash bargaining logic beyond
its bilateral roots to the m×n supply chain context, provided we define the default values
appropriately and relax the conventional constraints on their sum. That relaxation is not
necessary in special cases. For example, using the fact that the second best options for
the efficient firms can never be better than the maximal possible surplus (πM2b ≤ πM and
πM2s ≤ πM ), it can be shown that the default inequality (πM2b +πM2s ≤ πM ) is guaranteed
to hold in bilateral monopoly (1 × 1, so (πM2b ∨ 0) = (πM2s ∨ 0) = 0), and with one-sided
competition (1 × n where (πM2s ∨ 0) = 0, and m × 1 where (πM2b ∨ 0) = 0). In each of
these standard cases, the BP solution is a natural and intuitive outcome for the bargaining
problem and coincides with a Nash bargaining representation of the problem with passive
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default options equal to the second best alternatives for the efficient firms. This will also be
the case in constant quantity problems (Figure 5) when we add the constraint (described
previously, based on the fact that the monopolist also bargains rationally) that no chain
disjoint from an efficient pair can generate positive surplus, so r2−c2 ≤ 0. To see this, note
that if the second best firms are viable partners then πM2s = r1 − c2 and πM2b = r2 − c1,
so πM2s + π
M2
b ≤ πM if and only if (r1 − c2) + (r2 − c1) ≤ r1 − c1 which is true if and only
if r2 − c2 ≤ 0.
However, with nonlinear costs it is easy to generate examples where disjoint chains cannot
generate positive surplus, consistent with a whole-chain bargaining outcome, yet πM2b +
πM2s > π
M . This raises stability issues when the excluded buyers and suppliers are active
agents in the negotiations rather than passive default alternatives. Since we predict a
buyer’s profit of πb = .5{πM − πM2b + πM2s }, when πM2b + πM2s > πM we have πb < πM2s .
That is, the second most competitive (but currently excluded) supplier can, in concert
with the efficient buyer, generate profits strictly greater than what the buyer is currently
getting. Hence, the excluded supplier can make an attractive offer to the buyer. To
further investigate the properties of the BP solution, we need to look beyond bilateral
bargaining theory with passive alternatives to what cooperative game theory has to say
about multiple strategic agents in negotiations. Specifically, we want to know if the BP
solution is consistent with existing solution concepts in those more general games.
Relationship of the BP solution to cooperative games
Like bargaining games, cooperative games have no single universally accepted notion of a
solution, but there are several alternatives in the literature that are sufficiently popular to
merit consideration. The constructs we will consider rely on a “coalitional” or “character-
istic function” representation of the game. A coalition C is any subset of the m+n players
in the two tiers. For any coalition C , let Cb(C) denote the set of buyers in C and Cs(C)
the set of suppliers in C , so that Cb(C) ∪ Cs(C) = C . We define Cg to be the “grand
coalition” of all m + n players. Define the real-valued characteristic function V on the
set of coalitions to be the profits that the coalition could generate without any help from
outside the coalition (c.f. Myerson 1991). V (C) is set to zero if either Cb(C) or Cs(C) are
empty (that is, C does not contain at least one buyer and one supplier). Contingent on
coalition C having the contract and containing at least one buyer and one supplier,




meaning the coalition uses their lowest cost supplier and highest value buyer as their active
players to generate the most value for the coalition. Note that this implicitly assumes that
coalitions form for bargaining power only, and not to distribute production. That is, the
same fixed tooling or other costs that drive a buyer to use a single supplier are in play in
coalitions.
Clearly V (Cg) will be the maximum profit available, equal to πM . An allocation π ∈ Rm+n
is a division of profits among the m+n players. For ease of notation we will use
∑m+n
i=1 πi
to denote the sum of the allocations over all players, and
∑
k∈C πk to denote the sum over
all firms in C (buyers and sellers). An allocation is “feasible” if
∑m+n
i=1 πi = V (Cg) and for
all i, πi ≥ V ({i}) = 0. The first condition says that we don’t allocate more to players than
we have to work with, but we do allocate all available surplus (otherwise there would be an
alternative distribution of benefits that is preferred by everybody). The second condition
is that each player gets at least what she could get on her own. Feasible allocations are
called “imputations” in some of the extant literature.
Given a feasible allocation π, we say another feasible allocation π′ dominates π on C ,




i ≤ V (C). The first condition says
that members of C will unambiguously and unanimously prefer π′ to π, and the second
condition says that the members of C can defect from the current allocation and fund
the new allocation π′ by themselves with no additional help. Under these conditions, the
allocation π is vulnerable to disruption, because members of C see a clearly superior and
implementable alternative.
The core of a cooperative game is defined as the set of undominated feasible allocations,
that is the set of feasible allocations π for which no set C and alternative feasible allocation
π′ exist with π′ C π. It can be shown (c.f. Myerson 1991) that the core is the set
{π | πi ≥ 0 ∀i,
∑m+n
i=1 πi = V (Cg) and for all coalitions C ,
∑
k∈C πk ≥ V (C)}. The core
is a strong contender for a solution concept to cooperative games, because it represents a
sort of stability or resistance to disruption by any coalition of actors. The problem with
the core as a solution concept is that it can be empty for many games of interest, because
it disallows myopic defections that may, with some far-sightedness, be recognized as non-
threatening in the long run to the coalition. We discuss this in more detail in the next
section.
We will ignore nonviable firms (buyers i for which πMij < 0 for all suppliers j, and suppliers
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j for which πMij < 0 for all buyers i) so in what follows m and n count only potentially
viable suppliers and buyers. If m = 0 or n = 0 no deal is struck and no business done, so
we assume that m and n are at least 1. We begin by analyzing the core in 1× 1 (bilateral
monopoly) and m×1 systems. These are intuitively straightforward in that the sole buyer
must be active in any supply chain and has discretion over which supplier(s) to work with.
Proposition 4: In m× 1 supply chains:
a) If m = n = 1 (bilateral monopoly) the core is any nonegative division of the potential
social surplus πM between the two firms.
b) If m > 1 (multiple suppliers and one buyer) let i∗ denote the sole buyer and j∗ (any one
of) the efficient supplier(s). The core is the set of allocations giving zero profit to suppliers
other than j∗, (πM2s ∨ 0) ≤ πi∗ ≤ πM , and πj∗ = πM − πi∗ . In particular if there are
multiple efficient suppliers (πM2s = πM ) then the only core allocation gives all surplus to
the buyer i∗.
c) The BP allocations are in the core and predict profits to each firm exactly in the middle
of its range of core values.
In m × 1 bargaining chains the core is always non-empty, and predicts that only efficient
suppliers can make positive profits, consistent with the BP solution’s selection of efficient
pairs for contracting. For an efficient pair the core allocations are not unique, but for all
firms (efficient or otherwise) the BP solution predicts profits in the middle of each firm’s
range of core profits.
The supplier-bidding scenario implicit in m × 1 systems is a familar and intuitively clear
context. However, in 1 × n and m × n systems with n > 1, the tier 2 suppliers cannot
arbitrarily choose among the tier 1 buyers, because the new partnership will not be ben-
eficial unless the tier 1 buyer can also compete successfully for the contract from the tier
0 monopolist. We revise the characteristic function definition to include this complication
(we invoke the logic presented with Figure 3c above that no alternative, disjoint chain
can generate positive profits when we consider tier 1 bidding for the contract from the
tier 0 monopolist). The details along with the proof of the following theorem are in the
appendix.
Proposition 5: In m× n supply chains with n > 1:
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a) If m = 1 (a single supplier j∗ and multiple potential buyers) the core is the set of
allocations with zero allocation to firms other than an efficient pair i∗ and j∗, where
(πM2b ∨ 0) ≤ πj∗ ≤ πM and πi∗ = πM − πj∗ . In particular if there are multiple efficient
buyers (πM2b = π
M ) then the only core allocation gives all surplus to the supplier.
b) In m × n systems, the core is the set of allocations with zero allocation to firms other
than an efficient pair i∗ and j∗,
(πM2s ∨ 0) ≤ πi∗ ≤ πM − (πM2b ∨ 0)
(πM2b ∨ 0) ≤ πj∗ ≤ πM − (πM2s ∨ 0)
and πj∗ + πi∗ = πM . In particular, if πM2s + πM2b > π
M the core is empty.
c) If the core exists the BP allocations are in the core and predict profits to each firm
exactly in the middle of its range of core values.
The core, when it exists, is a compelling candidate for allocations in a cooperative game
because it is features no myopic temptations to defect. In all cases in which the core exists
the BP solution is in the core and predicts profits for each firm to be exactly in the middle
of the core range. However, when πM2s + πM2b > π
M the core does not exist. In practical
reality negotiations are still likely to close in these cases, and analytically the BP solution
still exists and can be computed as shown. But, the concept of core cannot be used to
reinforce that outcome. In the following we compare the BP prediction to an alternative,
and more far-sighted, solution concept for cooperative games.
The BP solution and von Neumann and Morgenstern’s solutions
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) call a set of feasible allocations Π∗ a
solution set to a cooperative game if it equals the set of feasible allocations not dominated
by any element of Π∗. This rather circular definition clearly implies that elements of Π∗ are
not dominated by any other element of Π∗, but also that any feasible allocation π /∈ Π∗
is dominated by some element of Π∗. These solution sets allow for the possibility that
there exists a π ∈ Π∗ and a π′ /∈ Π∗ such that π′ C π for some coalition C (which could
rationally prompt a defection), but in that case since π′ /∈ Π∗ there exists a π′′ ∈ Π∗ and
a coalition C ′ such that π′′ C′ π′. That is, the bargaining process may rationally leave
the set but will always have a rational path back into the set, because any defection out of
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Π∗ can be counteracted by another defection that brings the allocation back into Π∗. We
will call such solution sets “VNM solution sets” or “VNM sets.”
VNM sets avoid the common criticism of core concepts that look only at myopic defections,
without regard for what will happen next, to define stability. Players can disrupt a VNM
set, but reasonable foresight suggests the gains may well be short-lived. One problem with
VNM sets is that there can be many of them. Von Neumann and Morgenstern say that
each such set represents an internally consistent standard of behavior, appropriate for a
given social order.
The core is a subset of any VNM solution set, because if any feasible allocation π is
undominated then clearly it is undominated by members of any VNM set Π∗, and so is an
element of Π∗. But, VNM solution sets are larger and more varied than the core, and can
contain some counter-intuitive outcomes. That is, while the core may be too restrictive
as a solution concept, VNM sets may be too inclusive. There is no current agreement on
what constitutes a solution to a general cooperative game, which is why we compare the
BP solution to several of them.
The proof of the next proposition shows that the set of allocations where the total social
surplus is divided between one efficient supplier and one efficient buyer is a VNM set. Since
all BP allocations have this character, it is immediate that the BPallocation is in a VNM
solution set.





is a VNM set, so in particular the BP allocation is always contained in a VNM
set.
The BP solution and Shapely values
Shapely (1953) developed a series of axioms which, if assumed to hold, imply that there is
one and only one characteristic function that reflects the expected payoff to each player in
a cooperative game. The Shapely value is a combinatorial expression with the following
heuristic logic (c.f. Myerson 1991). Suppose you lined up all the players in a random
sequence, and had them enter a “room” (representing a coalition) in that order. What
is the expected incremental value that each brings into the coalition? The value that
player i brings to a coalition C is the difference in characteristic values, V (C ∪ {i}) −
V (C). The Shapely value is not generally consistent with horizontal competition, and in
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particular with the BP solution, because the Shapely value can be positive even for very
uncompetitive firms. As long as there is some collection of individuals, no matter how
inefficient they are, who are better off with player i than without player i, then player i
will have a strictly positive Shapely value (that is, some coalition C that can do better
as C ∪ {i}). For example, suppose quantity is fixed and suppliers’ costs are ordered as
c1  c2...  cj−1 << cj and buyers revenues ordered as r1  r2...  rk−1 >> rk,
and cj < rk. Then the Shapely values for supplying firm j and buying firm k, which
are supposed to predict their expected profits in negotiations, will be strictly positive
because firm j brings positive value to the “coalition” {k} and vice versa. But, these very
uncompetitive firms would be marginalized in actual negotiations (bid out of contention)
and make no profit. This suggests a level of horizontal sharing implicit in the Shapely
value that is not compatible with horizontal competition among firms making perfectly
substitutable products. In section 8 below we will see that the Shapely value is one of
several possible solution concepts that is broadly consistent with notions of “distributive
justice” that arise in the experimental record. These concepts are better suited for supply
situations in which each supplying firm has veto power, for example in an assembly context
where each supplier is a monopolist for one component, so each firm’s cooperation is
necessary for anybody to make any money.
The BP solution has the attractive features of addressing an important and realistic busi-
ness context with no currently known solution, yet is sufficiently close to familiar Nash
bargaining theory and the theory of cooperative games to be comfortably credible. A
natural next step would be validation of its predictions with laboratory or field data. No
experimental results yet exist for the m × n supply chain problem, in part because there
existed no predictive theory to test (a void we fill here). There is, however, some exper-
imental evidence relevant to some versions of the supply chain problem. We review this
next.
4. Bargaining experiments and intuition
The experimental economics literature is dominated by investigations of efficiency in al-
ternative market structures (Bertrand versus Cournot, one-sided versus double auctions,
open versus sealed bidding, etc.) and/or individual decision making (testing theories of
individual choice). The subset of that literature devoted to bargaining is relatively small,
but does contain some material relevant to the m × n supply chain problem. In these the
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bargaining problem and context are sufficiently simple that transactions costs or bounded
rationality issues are not significant. The experimental findings with substantial support
are:
a) In small-numbers bargaining with complete information we can expect efficient out-
comes.
b) In symmetrical bilateral monopolies we can expect an even division of the available
surplus.
c) Non-cooperative game theoretic solutions are poor predictors of actual behaviors in
simple laboratory experiments.
We discuss each of these in turn.
In small-numbers bargaining with complete information we can expect efficient outcomes
In contrast to early economists (e.g. Edgeworth 1881, Marshall 1890, and Bowley 1928)
who considered small numbers bargaining problems indeterminate, Stigler (1942) and Fell-
ner (1949) occupied the intermediate position that in bilateral monopoly the negotiators
will agree on the efficient quantity but price remains indeterminate. Their reasoning is
that the surplus maximizing quantity is in the bargainers’ mutual interests, because from
any other quantity it would be possible to re-open negotiations and increase the profits
of both. So, the efficient quantity will be decided first because they can agree on that,
and then they will bargain over the division of the total surplus (the price). The clas-
sic experiments of Siegel and Fouraker (1960) support this position. In the same year a
seminal paper by Coase (1960) argued that in bilateral bargaining over economic external-
ities, with complete information and in the absence of transactions costs a socially efficient
arrangement will arise regardless of how property rights are assigned (provided they are
assigned unambiguously). This was a rejoinder to economists (e.g. Pigou) advocating
governmental interventions in the form of taxes or subsidies to address externalities and
restore social efficiency. Because of their significant policy implications, Coase’s claims re-
ceived a lot of experimental attention. Most of the results strongly supported the efficiency
result (c.f. Hoffman and Spitzer 1982, Harrison and McKee 1985 and references there).
These experiments involved bilateral rather than multi-lateral negotiations, but in one set
of four-person cooperative games conducted by Michener et al (1979) efficiency was again
the norm. None of these experiments involved the selection (or rejection) of active firms
in addition to bargaining over price and quantity, so they do not align exactly with the
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supply chain context. Still, unless and until further experiments refine our understanding
the weight of existing evidence is in favor or Stigler’s and Fellner’s early intuition that in
unstructured, small-numbers bargaining with complete information we can expect efficient
outcomes.
In symmetrical bilateral monopolies we can expect an even division of the available surplus
At the efficient quantity there are many different possible divisions of the total surplus
(transfer prices), leading to the remaining indeterminateness in Stigler and Fellner’s posi-
tions. For example, in bilateral monopoly the price can vary anywhere between the seller’s
cost and the buyer’s revenues, corresponding to Edgeworth’s contract curve or Pareto’s
optima. Some economists, however, went further to predict a specific price that will be
realized along this curve. Pigou (1908) argues that when bargaining powers are equal the
solution that each party interprets as a draw is the most likely, and that usually this will
be an equal division of the payoffs. Zeuthen (1930), Nash (1950), Raiffa (1953), Harsanyi
(1956) and Schelling (1960) all agree that this makes sense. In the absence of any salient
differences in who is “deserving,” 50/50 splits seem to be recognized as a “fair” outcome,
and therefore compelling, in a wide range of cultures (c.f. Roth et al 1991 and Henrich et
al 2004). This also has experimental support (Siegel and Fouraker 1960, Roth and Malouf
1979). In fact, an even division of wealth appears to be a strong attractor (Schelling 1960
calls it a “focal point”) even when contrary to self-interest. For example, in tests of Coase’s
claims unambiguous property rights (which were essentially rights to wealth) were granted
to just one party in the negotiations, yet 50/50 splits appeared more frequently than one
would expect given purely self-interested behavior (c.f. Hoffman and Spitzer 1982, Harri-
son and McKee 1985 and references there). Given the experimental evidence to date, we
can expect an even division of the surplus in bilateral monopolies (1 × 1 chains) with no
differentiating features between the actors.
Non-cooperative game theoretical solutions are poor predictors of actual behaviors in simple
laboratory experiments
In contrast to Nash’s (1950) axiomatic approach to bargaining theory, there is another class
of bilateral bargaining models based on non-cooperative game theory that was initiated
by Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offers model. In a single-stage version of this model
(called the “ultimatum game”) one player is declared the principal and can make a single
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other player (agent), who can only accept (in which case the
25
principal-specified offer is implemented) or reject (nobody gets anything) the offer. This 2-
stage game has a unique subgame perfect equlibrium (SPE) in which the principal makes
the smallest possible positive offer to the agent, essentially taking all of the wealth for
herself. Even in experiments specifically designed to test the required sequence of events,
the SPE is almost never observed. The deviations from SPE were significant and pervasive,
generating substantial interest in the experimental community and fostering repeat studies
to confirm and understand it. The result of all of this work is a substantial confirmation
that the SPE is not predictive of actual behaviors (Guth et al 1982, Kahneman et al 1986,
Forsythe et al 1994, Eckel and Grossman 2001), and that deviations from SPE tend to be
in the direction toward a more egalitarian division of wealth.
Hoffman et al (1998) speculate that deviations from individual profit maximization to
achieve fair outcomes is fundamental to humans as social animals, and has evolved over
millennia to solve problems of social exchange long before our ancestors had markets or
monetary systems. They cite evidence that included in these norms of social exchange are
equality (gains should be shared equally in the absence of any objective difference between
individuals) and equity (individuals who contribute more to an accomplishment should
benefit with a larger share of the rewards). This notion of equity aligns with Guths (1988)
invocation of “distributive justice” to explain the results of his bargaining experiments. It
is not clear how or if our primordial tendencies have been modified by modern cultures,
but if any behaviors are fundamental to our species there is hope for some cross-cultural
consistency in behavioral models. Indeed, the work of Roth et al (1991) and Henrich et
al (2004) suggests that deviations from the ultimatum game SPE in the direction of a
more egalitarian division of the wealth is internationally and culturally robust. In another
bid for universality, Brett (2001) advises managers negotiating across cultural boundaries
that the two major sources of power in negotiations are one’s best available alternative to
agreement (the default or disagreement values in bilateral bargaining) and fairness as a
universal norm.
Consistency of the balanced principal solution with the experimental record
The experimental record for bargaining chains is incomplete. Most experiments were set
up to test something else, most are bilateral, and none involve the simultaneous selection of
active firms and price-quantity negotiations between them. When we depart from undiffer-
entiated bilateral monoplies, there is much less that can be said with confidence based on
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current evidence. Personal and structural attributes that may bias the bargaining outcome
in one direction or another include (c.f. the reviews in Hagel and Roth 1995, and Camerer
2003) bargaining prowess, risk aversion or impatience, starting endowments, levels of in-
formation and familiarity, social versus unilateral utility functions (both for the bargainer
and assumed for the opponent based on experience or culture), structure of the interac-
tion (face-to-face or electronically mediated), levels of horizontal competition (alternative
sources/buyers), longer term considerations (relationships and reputation) if negotiations
will repeat, and socio-cultural issues related to race, gender, and/or personal history. An
abundance of additional evidence will be required to sort through this complexity.
However, some features of the existing experimental record recur sufficiently often to be
tentatively accepted pending further evidence. These include efficiency in simple, small-
numbers bargaining situations with complete information, an equal division of wealth in
undifferentiated bilateral monopolies, and behaviors that deviate significantly from non-
cooperative predictions. The BP solution is consistent with these. Among the many
potentially influential structural and personal features of a negotiation, alternatives (to
closure) and notions of fairness are frequently encountered drivers of the eventual division
of the wealth. The BP prediction is consistent with that reduction. In b-to-b negotia-
tions with horizontal competition, the next best alternative for any player is their next
best supplier (buyer). After adjusting for the effects of horizontal competition, the BP
solution divides the remaining surplus equally (as does the Nash bargaining solution when
it applies).
It is interesting, against this backdrop, that the current supply chain literature is dominated
by P-A models and assumptions of some form of inefficiency (requiring address, in the
form of a scholarly intervention). In addition to differing on issues of efficiency, P-A and
bargaining approaches generally predict different distributions of wealth in the chain. This
is important because advice to managers must be based on how the distribution of profits
to individual firms will vary with different managerial options. In the next section we
compare P-A and BP predictions for cost-reduction initiatives. A continued accumulation
of institutional knowledge and empirical research will be necessary to know which model
and recommendations are appropriate in different managerial contexts.
5. Managerial consequences
Current industrial practice includes buyers investing in cost-reducing process improvements
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in themselves and/or their suppliers. It aligns with business intuition and practice that
developing competing suppliers can also be beneficial to the buyer. What intuition emerges
from our complete information m×n bargaining model? Is it more beneficial to reduce your
own costs, or reduce your supplier’s costs? Is it better to reduce your direct supplier’s costs,
or reduce a competing supplier’s costs? If you are a buyer and it is possible to increase
your tier 1 competitor’s costs (by lobbying for legislation, for example, that works to your
advantage and to the detriment of competing buyers) is that preferable to working on your
own (or your suppliers’) costs? Are the prescriptions based on our bargaining model the
same or different than those implicit in P-A models?
In Table 1 we compare the price and profitability consequences of these initiatives, and
also compare the BP solution with a P-A model when one exists, for different competitive
scenarios. We use a constant quantity model for transparency, and assume the firms are
ordered (as in Figure 5) with strict differences between the two most efficient firms in a
tier, so that r1 > r2 ≥ ... ≥ rn and c1 < c2 ≤ ... ≤ cm. The entries in Table 1 are from the
perspective of the efficient buyer (with value r1). The cost to the efficient supplier is c1.
So, πM = r1 − c1, πM2s = (r1 − c2) ∨ 0 and πM2b = (r2 − c1) ∨ 0. In the BP solution the
efficient buyer and supplier will be active at a transfer price of p = .5
(
(r1 ∧ c2)+(r2 ∨ c1)
)
,
(where c2 = ∞ and/or r2 = −∞ if these competitors do not exist), and the profit to the
efficient buyer equals r1 − p. The entries in Table 1 are for a one unit improvement in one
of the four parameters r1, r2, c1 or c2. From the perspective of the efficient buyer, this
would be a one-unit decrease in c1, c2 or r2, or a one unit increase in r1, as indicated in
the top row of each set of outcomes in Table 1.
Table 1 shows only the benefits of the various improvements, and does not include the
costs of achieving these. Practical application would have to include a consideration of
how difficult it is to effect these changes. For example, suppose Table 1 shows that an
improvement in r1 is more beneficial than a reduction in c1. The reduction in c1 can still
be preferable if it is less costly to achieve, for example if an efficient buyer is sourcing from
a poorly managed supplier for which cost reductions are easy to identify and implement.
Of course, if Table 1 shows a reduction in c1 offers no benefit, the costs of the reduction
are irrelevant.
Where to invest according to the BP model?
Looking first at the bargaining outcomes, we see that a unit improvement in one’s own
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cost is always at least as beneficial, and sometimes more so, than a unit change in the
costs for any other firm. This makes intuitive sense, since the profit to the efficient buyer
is r1 − p so improvements in r1 have a direct effect, while improvements elsewhere can
only impact the buyer via price. Further, a unit improvement elsewhere would translate
into a full unit price reduction only if the buyer captured all of the benefits of the remote
improvement, which bargaining solutions seldom do. Note that the only maximal entry (a
“1”) in the net benefit row for the BP solution is in the r1 column, referring to a reduction
in the buyer’s own costs. The reasons for this dominance, however, differ by competitive
scenario. When there is supply-side competition (2×1 and 2×2 systems) an improvement
in r1 need not be shared with the supplier via an increase in price, giving it a natural
advantage. In bilateral monopoly (1 × 1 systems) all improvements are shared equally.
With only buyer-side competition (1 × 2) improvements in r1 must be shared with the
supplier, but improvements in the supplier’s costs are not shared with the buyer, again
giving improvements in r1 the edge.
Now consider changes other than to r1. First, there is no benefit to improving any firm that
is not the most or second most efficient in each tier. Increasing the number of competitors,
for example, has no effect beyond two (unless the new firms are more efficient than one
of the existing firms, in which case they replace the inefficient firm in the competitive
analysis). When we hold r1 constant investments in other firms affect the efficient buyer’s
profit via price, mediated by the degree of competition. A monopolist buyer is indifferent
between improvements in her direct supplier’s costs or a viable competing supplier. For
example, in 2×1 systems reducing c1 or c2 yields the same benefit, because the buyer wants
to demand c1 but the efficient supplier need not bid less than c2, so the price is determined
equally by c1 and c2. However, when the efficient buyer has viable competition investing in
her direct supplier has no benefit. For example, in 2× 2 systems the buyer’s demands are
limited by competition to r2 and the efficient supplier’s demands by c2, so the negotiated
price is determined by c2 and r2. In that case, reducing c2 is strictly better for the buyer
than reducing c1, which would provide no benefit.
In summary, for the efficient buyer reducing her own costs weakly dominates adjusting
the costs in any other firm. However, with viable supplier competition investing in the
alternative supplier weakly dominates investing in her direct supplier. With strong buyer
power she is indifferent between the two, but with two-sided competition the marginal
firms determine the price so working with the alternative supplier dominates working with
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her direct supplier.
Bargaining and principal-agent models compared
The currently dominant approach in the supply chain literature is to grant one of the play-
ers principal status and solve the resulting principal-agent (P-A) problem using standard
non-cooperative machinery. We can compare the BP recommendations to those of P-A
models in three of the four cases. For bilateral monopolies and 2×1 systems, we grant the
buyer principal status. For 1× 2 systems we use the B→1 solution, which grants the buy-
ing tier principal status and is a simple case of common agency (Bernheim and Whinston
1986). For 2× 2 systems no P-A solution is available. Prat and Rustichini (2003) provide
an analysis of m×n systems where the n principals get to make offers first, but restricted to
the case where an individual agent’s reward depends only on his/her unilateral action. In
our case the awarding of the contract depends on the actions of all agents in competition,
a situation for which Prat and Rustichini say no general characterization is available.
Table 1 shows that there are two major differences between the predictions of the P-A and
bargaining models. First, in a P-A model it is never beneficial to invest in a competing
supplier. For example, in a 2×1 system the principal buyer can extract all of the rent (make
the efficient supplier a take-it-or-leave-it offer of c1 regardless of what c2 is), so reducing
c1 is very beneficial but reducing c2 has no value. In contrast, in the bargaining model the
supplier need not agree to accept only c1, because as long as he is pricing his competitor
out of the market (asking for less than c2) he has as much monopoly power as the buyer.
The negotiated price, therefore, is somewhere between c1 and c2, so reducing either will
benefit the buyer. The second major difference between the bargaining and P-A models
is that, when both predict some value for an improvement, the predicted benefit in the
P-A model weakly dominates that in the bargaining model. This reflects the advantages of
principal status relative to the more egalitarian outcomes familiar in bargaining solutions.
Process improvement efforts generate societal benefits that in a bargaining outcome will
be partially shared along the chain, so the private gains to a buyer for such efforts will be
less than she expects if she anticipates keeping all the benefits for herself.
Consistency with business practice
Cost reduction efforts in one’s direct supplier is common business practice, and is consistent
(under the stated conditions) with both the P-A and bargaining intuition. The biggest
difference between these approaches concerns investments in competing suppliers, which
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in a complete information setting is supported (again, under the stated conditions) by the
bargaining approach but not by the P-A approach. In this, the bargaining predictions
are more consistent with industrial practice (as described to the author in a series of
interviews with supply chain managers), in which the development of alternative suppliers
for key inputs is common practice. Supply chain managers interviewed by the author
explained that a strong supply alternative strengthened one’s hand in bargaining, and lack
of an alternative (that is, a monopolist supplier) would result in the supplier getting more
of the potential surplus. That is bargaining power is driven, in part, by ones next best
alternative. This is consistent with bargaining theory and the intuition developed here,
and with Brett’s (2001) identification of alternatives as the key driver of bargaining power
in global business negotiations.
The recommendation to expand the approved supply base is also consistent with P-A
intuition, but only with incomplete information and for different reasons. In theoretical
treatments of auctions under incomplete and asymmetric information (c.f. Myerson 1981,
Krishna 2002) adding more bidders has the advantage of driving supply prices down as each
bidder strategically considers what it will take to win the auction, which in an incomplete
information setting is an extreme value (low bid) statistic over all bidders. So, more bidders
(even beyond two) is always better from the perspective of the buyer. This consideration
is moot in a complete information setting where the optimal “auction” design reduces
to the principal making a single take-it-or-leave-it offer to the efficient supplier at their
indifference point, and alternative suppliers are irrelevant. Industrial practice reflects both
of these intuitions, with some additional nuances. If a buyer is uncertain of costs it makes
sense to get bids from more than one supplier, for its information revelation advantages.
While theoretically it can be beneficial to continue to add bidders indefinitely, in practice
the overhead of processing bids will keep the numbers low. If a buyer is confident of costs
(this was common in testimony to the author) then the potential to use the second best
supplier is used to argue for a “fair allocation more beneficial to the buyer. This was
mentioned specifically by supply chain managers in the author’s interviews and reinforces
bargaining intuition. Another business consideration not addressed by either of these
approaches is the possibility of collusion among suppliers or buyers, which is easier with
small numbers. A modest expansion of the supply base (essentially developing another
supplier, or reducing her costs to be a viable competitor) can reduce the risk of collusion,
especially if the new supplier is in a different geographical region. Current industrial
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practice combines all of these considerations. In summary, current industrial practice and
intuition (as described to the author) have the following features:
• A buyer’s next best alternative supplier is a significant source of bargaining power, so
developing such suppliers can be beneficial.
• Monopolists anywhere upstream in the chain can extract extaordinary rents, so develop-
ing some competition in that tier will benefit the buyer.
• Information is power in negotiations, so firms go to great lengths to understand what
inputs “should” cost.
• If despite those efforts cost information remains incomplete, then having more bidders
for a contract has information revelation advantages.
• Practicality demands a limited number of bidders.
• When collusion is suspected, spreading the bidders out (geographically for example) may
reduce that risk.
The model here, which assumes complete information and horizontal competition (no
collusion) is consistent with the first three of these. The model can anticipate the effects
of collusion on profits to all parties in the chain by assuming the colluding actors are
present in negotiations as one single firm. However, we do not explicitly consider when
such collusive sets will be stable or, given stability, how internally they would divide the
total profit to firms in the set. An assumption of complete information is surprisingly
consistent with testimony to the author, which came primarily from large mature firms
who go to great lengths to understand the cost structure of their suppliers. However, some
of the suppliers the author spoke with were more skeptical of buyers’ knowledge. We will
say some more about incomplete information in section 7 below.
The BP solution allows us to predict the distribution of profits between two tiers in an
m × n supply system. In the next section we concatenate several of these systems into
longer supply chains and investigate the distribution of profits along the chain as a function
of the degree of horizontal competition in each tier.
6. Multi-echelon bargaining chains
Having provided a solution for general m × n two-tier systems, we can link these up to
model supply chains with an arbitrary number of tiers downstream of the commodity
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inputs. Because many firms have only limited visibility upstream in their own chains, it
is important to understand what longer-chain phenomena may be managerially relevant.
We will assume quantity is fixed, delaying comment on the general case until later in this
section. It is common in practice for tier 0 firms to forecast their sales volumes (based on
product attibutes, market research and assumed price points) prior to requesting quotes
for supply. So, the RFQ’s go out to potential tier 1 suppliers at a specified volume or
volume range.
We need to expand our notation to accomodate supply chains with an arbitrary number
of tiers and an arbitrary number of firms in each tier. Figure 6 shows a generic two-tier
subchain consisting of tiers k (the buyers) and k + 1 (the suppliers). There are mk firms
in tier k. If buyer i is active, she can sell the output for pk−1 (the money received from
the downstream tier k − 1), and if supplier j is active he can buy inputs from tier k + 2
for pk+1. Firm i in tier k has value adding costs cik, which without loss of generality we
assume are ordered so that c1k ≤ c2k ≤ ..., and likewise for tier k + 1. So, the valuation of
the contract for buyer i is pk−1 − cik and the cost of supply for supplier j is pk+1 + cjk+1.
These mk+1 + mk firms bargain over who will be active and what the transfer price will
be. We denote the number of tiers by nT .
A supplying firm becomes active by being chosen as the supplier to the active buyer. A
buying firm becomes active by competing successfully for supply from the active supplier.
The active pair must be the simultaneous choices of each other among all of the competing
bids. Put into a multi-echelon context, this reflects a fairly extensive set of rounds of
negotiations. Buyers in tier k compete for the services of suppliers in tier k+1 so that they
are better positioned to compete for the contract to supply tier k−1 (moving downstream
to the next pair of tiers, tier k contains the suppliers to the tier k − 1 buyers). This
competition to supply tier k − 1 may change the price pk−1 which will touch off another
round of negotiations between tiers k and k+1 because the firms in tier k now have altered
valuations. Likewise, suppliers in tier k+1 compete with each other to supply tier k in the
usual fashion, wishing to bid aggressively enough to get the contract but to simultaneously
maximize their own profits and have enough surplus remaining to compete successfully
for supply from tier k + 2. Negotiations between tiers k + 1 and k + 2 may change the
price pk+1, to which the tier k to k + 1 negotiations must then adjust. The solution to
this multi-echelon bargaining problem will feature simultaneous stability. That is, transfer
price pk must be consistent with the valuations of the bargaining firms in tiers k + 1 and
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k (at their input and output prices pk+1 and pk−1), but pk−1 must also be consistent with
the valuations of firms in tiers k and k− 1 at their input and output prices (pk and pk−2),
etc.
In business practice it is common for tier 0 to request quotes from tier 1, who first negotiate
with tier 2 over the supply price p1 before supplying their quote to tier 0, so the results
of the p1 negotiations are incorporated into tier 1’s valuation for the contract and their
negotiations over their supply price p0. Tier 2 behaves likewise with their suppliers when
responding to tier 1. Our model captures these interdependencies among the negotiations
along the supply chain. However, for long complex supply chains our model is likely an
idealized limit of practical reality. That is, for very short supply chains (and trivially for
two tiers only) it may be that these tier-wise negotiations continue until they are self-
consistent. But, for longer and more complex supply chains practical considerations likely
truncate the interdependencies somewhere short of complete consistency (for example a
small change in supply price to tier 4 may in practice have little effect on the negotiated
price between tiers 1 and 0). So our model is an idealized limit of the practical, boundedly
rational world of business.
The ability of a firm to capture surplus in negotiations is its “bargaining power,” which is
driven in our model by horizontal competition. The competitive structure in each two-tier
bargaining module is a function of the number of firms and their value adding costs in the
tiers, and the available surplus (determined by the upstream and downstream prices) that
they have to work with. Their negotiations determine the transfer price between them,
which affects the available surplus to neigboring tiers. To develop some intuition in this
complicated interdependent environment we begin with a more transparent model that
admits a closed form solution, treating “bargaining power” as an exogenous attribute of
each firm in a chain of tandem monopolies.
Tandem monopolies with exogenous bargaining power
Consider a supply chain of tandem monopolies (a single firm in each tier) bringing a fixed
quantity of product to market, where each firm in the chain must incur some value-adding
costs. Figure 7 shows such an nT + 1-firm (tiers 0 through nT ) supply chain. Firm 0 has
designed and will launch a product that society rewards with revenues r, but must garner
inputs from firm 1 to do so, who must secure supply from firm 2, etc. Firm nT must
secure raw material inputs costing crm. In addition to its procured inputs, firm k incurs
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value-added costs ck to process its inputs into outputs acceptable to firm k − 1. Because
there is just one firm per tier in this section, we may interchangeably refer to “firm” k and
“tier” k and we also drop the superscript i in the value-adding cost cik, since i = 1 always
with tandem monopolies.
Firm k + 1 will incur total cost pk+1 + ck+1 to supply the required inputs to firm k, and
firm k values those inputs at pk−1 − ck. So, if doing business makes sense (that is, if
pk+1 + ck+1 ≤ pk−1 − ck) the transfer price pk between firms k + 1 and k will be in the
range [pk+1 + ck+1, pk−1 − ck]. Where in this range the price ends up depends on the
relative bargaining power between firms k and k + 1. Specifically, negotiations will end
up at pk = λk(pk+1 + ck+1) + (1 − λk)(pk−1 − ck) for some λk ∈ [0, 1]. That price will
divide the total surplus available to tiers k and k + 1 (equal to pk−1 − ck − ck+1 − pk+1)
between the two firms, with the profit to firm k being πk = pk−1 − ck − pk and that to
firm k + 1 equal to πk+1 = pk − ck+1 − pk+1. A simple rearrangement of these expressions
reveals that λk is the fraction of the total available profit that goes to firm k, and fraction
(1 − λk) goes to firm k + 1. That is, λk represents the bargaining power of firm k relative
to firm k + 1. λk = 1 means firm k will extract all of the available surplus and λk = 0
means that firm k + 1 will extract that surplus. Most bargaining models try to predict λ
from more primitive inputs (e.g. horizontal competition, bargaining prowess, impatience,
risk aversion, etc.). Here we use λ as the system primitive, without a detailed exploration
of its source, and predict the distributional consequences as a function of the vector of λ
values in the chain. Below we will look specifically at the situation when bargaining power
is endogenously driven by horizontal competition.
Given any λ ∈ RnT (with elements λk for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT − 1) representing the relative
bargaining strength between each adjacent pair of firms in the chain, we say a price vector
p ∈ RnT +2 is a bargaining solution if
pk = λk(pk+1 + ck+1)+ (1−λk)(pk−1 − ck) = λkpk+1 +(1−λk)pk−1 +λkck+1− (1−λk)ck
for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT − 1, p−1 = r and pnT = crm. That is, a bargaining solution is a set of self-
consistent prices throughout the chain. This definition can be rewritten as p = Bp + C ,
< e−1, p >= r and < enT , p >= crm where < ... > denotes the inner product and ek
denotes the unit vector with a 1 in the kth position. The column vector C ∈ RnT +2 is
given by (C ′ denotes transpose)
C ′ = (0, λ0c1 − (1 − λ0)c0, λ1c2 − (1 − λ1)c1, . . .
35
. . . λkck+1−(1−λk)ck, . . . λnT−1cnT −(1−λnT−1)cnT−1, 0), and B is an (nT +2)×(nT +2)
“bargaining matrix” with the form
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
1 − λ0 0 λ0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 1 − λ1 0 λ1 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 1 − λn−1 0 λn−1
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
Note that the row sums of B equal 1, so that B has the structure of a transition matrix
for a Markov chain with nT + 2 states, which we label states −1 to nT . States −1 and nT
are absorbing, and constitute two different recurrent classes. There may be more recurrent
classes in B, depending on the λ values. The following proposition leverages known results
for such transition matrices to characterize bargaining solutions. All proofs are in the
appendix.
Proposition 7: The following are equivalent:
a) There exists a unique bargaining solution.
b) There are exactly two recurrent classes in the bargaining matrix B.
c) There do not exist indices i and j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ nT − 1 such that λi = 1 and λj = 0.

We will provide the intuition behind Proposition 7 in the discussion following the next
result, which shows how the unique solution in profits and prices can be computed in
closed form.
Proposition 8: If the bargaining solution is unique, then the unique associated profit













Πk−1j=0 (1 − λj)
)
and the unique bargaining solution p ∈ RnT +2 can be generated from p−1 = r, pk =
pk−1 − ck − πk for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT . We define the product Πbj=aλj to equal to one if b < a. 
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Define πtot to be the total potential surplus generated by the chain, that is πtot = r −∑nT
k=0 ck − crm. If there is a unique bargaining solution, then all firms will share some
portion of the total surplus. The profit to firm k is proportional to βk, which is a function
of the total bargaining strength upstream of firm k (upstream strength in negotiations
will lower the input price that buyers pay for goods) and the total bargaining weakness
downstream of k (downstream weakness will raise the output price that suppliers receive for
goods). If the basic Nash bargaining model is invoked between each pair of firms (λk = 1/2
for all k), then βk = (1/2)n for all k and πk = πtot/(n + 1); that is all firms (0 through
nT ) share the total potential chain-wide surplus equally. However, with asymmetrical
bargaining power the profit to firm k can depend on the bargaining strength of firms far
removed from k in the chain. In fact, if λj = 0 for any firm j upstream of k, or if λj = 1 for
any firm j downstream of k, the profits to firm k will be zero. We illustrate why this is true
using Figure 8. In Figure 8a we show the consequences for the rest of the chain when firm
2 has absolute bargaining power (λ2 = 1) . In this case p2 = p3 +c3, that is firm 2 bargains
firm 3 down to its zero profit position. Suppose all upstream pairs involving firms k ≥ 3
feature λk values strictly between zero and one. Then, these firms will share any available
surplus, meaning each will be strictly profitable as long as the total surplus available to
them is strictly positive. In fact, each firm k ≥ 3 will be strictly profitable as long as the
total surplus available to that subchain (which is p2 −
∑9
j=3 cj − crm) is strictly positive.
But, since λ2 = 1 any time firm 3 enjoys a positive profit it will be taken by firm 2 via a
lowering of the input price p2. The only possible self-consistent end to these negotiations
is for firms 3 and above to get zero profits and for firms 2 and those downstream of firm
2 to share the surplus πtot, as shown in Figure 8a. Figure 8b illustrates the fact that this
situation does not change if some firm (firm 6 say) upstream of firm 2 also has complete
bargaining power (λ6 = 1). Firm 6 will guarantee that all firms k ≥ 7 make no money, but
firm 2 will guarantee that the subchain of firms 3 through 6 also makes no money. Only
the most downstream λk = 1 matters. All upstream bargaining power is wasted for the
firms that have it. They cannot capture any rent. We summarize this as follows.
• If there is a unique bargaining solution and for any k, firm k has complete bargaining
power (λk = 1), then all upstream firms will make zero profit. Letting k∗ denote the most
downstream firm with complete bargaining power, then firms k∗ + 1 to nT will have zero
profits, and firms 1 to k∗ will share the potential surplus πtot.
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The same logic applies, in mirror image, if any firm has no bargaining power (λk = 0),
as shown in Figure 8c. Note again that multiple firms with no bargaining power do not
change anything, the most upstream firm with no power pre-ordains that all downstream
firms make zero profit.
• If there is a unique bargaining solution and for any k, firm k has no bargaining power
(λk = 0), then all downstream firms will make zero profit. Letting k∗ denote the most
upstream firm with no power, then firms 0 to k∗ will have zero profits, and firms k∗ +1 to
nT will share the potential surplus πtot.
Figure 8d shows the solution if some downstream firm has no bargaining power, while a
firm further upstream has complete bargaining power (recall there is still a unique solution
in this situation). The chain separates into zero profit subchains on the upstream and
downstream ends, and the “middle” firms share the potential surplus. Again, it does
not matter if we have several nested sets of firms with this configuration, only the most
downstream λk = 1 and the most upstream λk = 0 matter.
• If there is a unique bargaining solution and firm i is the most upstream firm with λi = 0
and firm j is the most downstream firm with λj = 1, then if i < j firms 0 to i and firms
j + 1 to nT will all make zero profits, and the potential social surplus πtot will be shared
by firms i + 1 to j.
Finally, Figure 8e shows what happens when the bargaining solution is not unique. For
this to happen, there must be a downstream firm with complete bargaining power and an
upstream firm with no bargaining power. In that case, the middle subchain between these
two firms will make zero profits and the upstream and downstream subchains will share the
social surplus πtot, but there are an infinite number of bargaining solutions that achieve
this. For example, in the special case of ck = 0 for k = 0 to nT so πtot = r−crm, the prices
along the middle (zero profit) subchain (which will all be equal) can be any p ∈ [crm, r]
and the downstream subchain profits will total r − p while the upstream subchain profits
total p − crm.
Complete bargaining power (λ = 1) or no bargaining power (λ = 0) are extreme situations,
in that they “separate the chain” and make one portion independent of another, regardless
of how rich the other side of the divide is. For example, λk = 1 implies that firm k + 1
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must give up all profit to firm k, and has no power to use firm k’s valuation of the contract
(pk−1 − ck) in negotiations. That is, pk = pk+1 + ck and is independent of pk−1. Likewise,
λk = 0 means that firm k must give up all potential profits to firm k +1, so pk = pk−1− ck
is independent of pk+1. In the absence of absolute power (or weakness) separating the
chain the bargained prices are unique, because a change in price at one part of the chain
must ripple through all tiers, which is disallowed by the fixed endpoints (revenues r and/or
the raw material costs crm).
Also, from Proposition 8, firm k may enjoy a very strong bargaining position with her
neighbors (λk is high) but if a firm further upstream has very low bargaining power or a
firm further downstream has very high power then firm k may be bargaining over just a
small amount of the total surplus. That is, there can be profit bottlenecks that prevent
profits from flowing to entire subchains, so that a firm may believe it is very competent in
its negotiations and is getting the best deal it can from its neighbors (which it is), but they
can be bargaining locally over a greatly diminished potential surplus because the majority
has been siphoned away at a remote part of the chain. This is important because in many
applied supply chain contexts firms bargain closely and carefully with their neighboring
tiers, but have much less knowledge about remote tiers. Yet, it may be at remote tiers
that the major influences on their profits are exercised.
The analysis in this section proceeded as if the λ values were system primitives, unchanging
even if the potential surplus being bargained over changes. This is unlikely to be the case
for horizontal competition as a driver of bargaining power because with different value-
adding costs the viability of different coalitions of buyers and suppliers (and hence the
degree of horizontal competition) is a function of the available surplus. However, we will
see in the next section that the intuition generated here remains valid.
Bargaining power driven by horizontal competition
We now consider multi-echelon bargaining chains with an arbitrary number of tiers (nT )
and an arbitrary number of competing firms in each tier (mk in tier k), focusing on hor-
izontal competition as the sole driver of bargaining power. We continue to assume that
quantity is fixed and that firms bargain over transfer prices along the chain. We use the
BP solution for each two-tier (mk+1×mk) subsystem, which when quantities are constant






{(pk+1 + c2k+1) ∧ (pk−1 − c1k) + (pk+1 + c1k+1) ∨ (pk−1 − c2k)} (1)
where p0 = r and pnT = crm. Note that only the two most competitive firms in each tier
matter, so that in terms of its solution a general mk+1×mk bargaining module reduces to
the 2 × 2 module consisting of its most efficient firms. This is a consequence of complete
local information and the bargaining context, because the potential surplus and the next
best alternative to any agreement are completely determined by the two most efficient
firms in each tier.
An intuitive feel for the BP bargaining solution can be gained by considering the different
possible competitive structures, as shown in Figure 9. To make this figure transparent, we
have defined r̃i = pk−1 − cik, the “net revenues” or total willingness-to-pay for the contract
by the ith most efficient buying firm in tier k. Likewise, we have defined c̃j = pk+1 + c
j
k+1,
the “total cost” of supply for the jth most efficient firm in the supplying tier k +1. In this





(r̃1 ∧ c̃2) + (r̃2 ∨ c̃1)].
Note that buying firm i and supplying firm j can only viably contract with each other
if r̃i ≥ c̃j, leading to four different possible competitive structures as shown in Figure 9.
The left hand side labels the cases A through D and gives the conditions under which
they exist. The middle graphic section visually illustrates the competitive contexts by
showing the viable buyer-supplier pairs being linked by an arc, and showing the firms
that influence price as shaded boxes. The dotted line in case D indicates that the price
is the same whether or not r̃2 = pk−1 − c2k ≥ pk+1 + c2k+1 = c̃2. The right hand side in
Figure 9 gives the BP price in each case. For example, case C is essentially a 2× 1 system
because while r̃1 ≥ c̃2 ≥ c̃1 (so the efficient buying firm can feasibly contract with either
supplier) we also have r̃2 ≤ c̃1 ≤ c̃2 so the second best buyer is not viable. The type
of competition (corresponding to the four cases shown in Figure 9) can change along the
chain, as a function of both the system primitives (revenues, value adding costs, and raw
material costs) but also as a function of the local surplus being bargained over (itself a
function of pricing behaviors throughout the chain).
Multi-echelon BP solutions to the system of equations (1) with non-negative profit con-




k=1 xk − yk
subject to
x0 = p1 + c11
xk ≥ pk+1 + c1k+1 for k = 1 to nT − 1
xk ≥ pk−1 − c2k for k = 1 to nT − 1
yk ≤ pk+1 + c2k+1 for k = 0 to nT − 1
yk ≤ pk−1 − c1k for k = 0 to nT − 1
pk = 12 (xk + yk) for k = 0 to nT − 1
p−1 = r
pnT = crm
pk−1 − c1k − pk ≥ 0 for k = 0 to nT .
In any optimal solution to this linear program xk = (pk+1 + c1k+1) ∨ (pk−1 − c2k) and
yk = (pk+1+c2k+1)∧(pk−1−c1k). Hence, pk will be correctly computed. The first constraint
recognizes that a monopolist occupies tier 0 (so c20 is essentially infinite), and the last set
of constraints ensures that all firms make non-negative profits. For general problems
uniqueness can be inferred from the solution to the LP in the usual manner, but we can
be more definitive with specific problem structures, as we will show below. We first show
that a multi-echelon BP solution will exist.
Proposition 9: If there is available social surplus, that is if r −∑nTk=0 c1k − crm ≥ 0, then
a multi-echelon BP solution will exist. 
If there is any way to do profitable business a BP solution will exist for the multi-echelon
bargaining chain. In some cases the solution is guaranteed to be unique, driven as we
might expect by conditions on the level of competitiveness within tiers throughout the
chain. Define Δck = c2k − c1k to be the degree of competition in tier k (the difference in
value adding costs between the most efficient and second most efficient firms in the tier).
The next proposition states that if Δck is decreasing in k then case B is impossible and the
BP solution is unique. The intuition is that with the cost advantage of the efficient firm
declining as we move up the supply chain, we will never be in a situation such as B with
strong supplier advantage relative to the buyers. Then, by eliminating case B we preserve
a strict dependence of price pk on price pk+1, so the chain never “separates” and changing
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any price pk implies a strict change in all upstream prices, leading to a contradiction with
fixed raw materials prices. So, there can be only one BP-feasible price vector.
Proposition 10: If Δck is decreasing in k then case B is impossible and the BP solution
is unique. 
Given that many new product supply chains feature sole-sourced suppliers making unique,
product-specific items downstream in the chain, shifting toward more generic inputs up-
stream (eventually becoming substitutable commodities), it is not unreasonable to expect
Δc to decrease going upstream in a chain. Mathematically, the logic in Proposition 10
could be replicated, for the most part, by eliminating case C which would imply a price
propagation going downstream in an analogous manner, but with a monopolist in tier 0
we cannot eliminate case C in all tiers.
The next result gives the structure of the unique BP solution when Δck is decreasing,
which facilitates a simple algorithm for its computation. Recall that the total available




k − crm. A profit vector πk is feasible if πk ≥ 0
for all k, and
∑nT
k=0 πk = πtot. There is a one-to-one relationship between feasible profit
vectors and prices via p−1 = r, pnT = crm and pk = pk−1 − c1k − πk for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT − 1, or
going the other way πk = pk−1 − c1k − pk for 1 ≤ k ≤ nT .
Corollary 10.1: If Δck is decreasing in k then there exists a kA such that the unique BP
solution is for the efficient firms in each tier to be active at transfer prices that generate
firm profits as follows:
a) πk = .5(c2k − c1k) for k > kA + 1, so profits are declining in k in that range.
b) πk = 1kA+2
[
r −∑kA+1j=0 c1j − pkA+1] for 0 ≤ k ≤ kA + 1, so profits are equal for all firms
in that range.
c) The unique BP prices can be recovered from pnT = crm and pk = πk+1 + c1k+1 + pk+1
for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT − 1. Case C holds for pk negotiations when kA + 1 ≤ k ≤ nT − 1 (unless
this is vacuous) and case A holds for all other negotiations. 
The proof of Corollary 10.1 justifies the following algorithm for generating the unique BP
price vector when Δck decreases in k. Because the solution is unique, we simply have to
find a BP-feasible set of prices, and one is guaranteed to be found by considering case A
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throughout, or case C for some set of upstream firms and case A for the rest. Begin by
computing equal profits to each firm π̄ = 1nT +1 (r−
∑n
k=0 ck−crm) in the entire chain (tiers
0 through nT ) and compare to the hypothesized case C profit of .5ΔcnT for the efficient
firm in tier nT . If π̄ ≤ .5ΔcnT then assuming case A throughout the chain is BP-feasible.
If not then set πnT = ΔcnT which pre-ordains transfer price pnT−1. Using that transfer
price, compute what π̄ would be if case A held for tiers 0 to nT − 1. That is, the efficient











Compare π̄ to the case C profit for tier nT − 1 (.5ΔcnT−1). If π̄ ≤ .5Δcn−1 then setting
profits equal to π̄ for tiers 0 through nT − 1 is BP-feasible. If not, continue moving
downstream, at each tier comparing the case C profits Δck to what the profits would have
to be if case A held for tiers 0 to k. In the end, either a point will be reached where
case C gives way to case A, or case C will continue to hold throughout. In any event, a
BP-feasible profit and price scenario is generated, which by uniqueness is the only possible
solution.
Under the conditions of Corollary 10.1 if there is so little total surplus, or the second best
firms in each tier are so inefficient, that all negotiations are esssentially between bilateral
monopolies then the total surplus is divided evenly throughout the chain. This is equiv-
alent to the tandem monopolies model with λk = .5 for all k. However, if there is viable
competition in any tier, it will be in the upstream tiers since by assumption competition
becomes more intense as we move up the supply chain (Δck declines). So, upstream we
are most likely to be in case C in which the transfer prices are determined by supply-side
competition. This may remain the case for all tiers but since Δck is increasing going down-
stream, there may also be a downstream negotiation where the cost separation between
the efficient and inefficient firms is too large for the remaining surplus to cover. In that
case, with no viable alternatives for either the buyer or seller, the negotiations are between
firms of equal bargaining power and negotiations end with equal profits to both. Since the
cost differences between the efficient and inefficient firms increase going downstream, once
the bilateral monopoly point is reached it is maintained for all downstream negotiations.
By assuming that competition increases going upstream, we are assuming that the down-
stream firms have a competitive advantage and profits move that way (that is profits will
be non-decreasing moving downstream in the chain).
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Two examples are shown in Figure 10, where nT = 6 and the value-adding costs are
shown in the boxes corresponding to the efficient and second best firms in each tier. Note
that the value-adding costs vary considerably, but Δck decreases systematically in both
examples, allowing us to easily compute the unique BP solution as above. In the Figure
10(a) kA = 1 so case C holds for the negotiations over pk for 2 ≤ k ≤ 5 and the profits
to firms 3 through 6 are just .5Δc. The second best firms in tiers 0 through 2 are not
competitive, so the efficient firms in these tiers bargain as monopolists and end up dividing
the remaining surplus equally. For example, in the negotiations between tiers 1 and 2
over the transfer price p1, note that the final prices p0 − p2 = 304.7 − 242 = 62.7 do
no provide enough surplus to cover the subchains incurring c11 + c22 = 12 + 53 = 65 or
c21 + c12 = 61 + 12 = 73, leaving essentially a negotiation between two monopolists with
no alternative outlets (case A). Figure 10(b) features the same parameters as Figure 10(a)
with the exception of the second best firms in tiers 1 and 2, which have improved their
performance. Now the negotiations result in final prices satisfying p0−p2 = 296−242 = 54
which will cover c11 + c22 = 12 + 33 = 45 (so that alternative subchain is viable) but will
not cover c21 + c
1
2 = 51 + 12 = 63 (so that subchain is not viable), implying case C. In
moving from Figure 10(a) to 10(b), c22 has decreased more than c21. The efficient firm in
tier 1 loses some power relative to tier 0 because of the increased competition in her own
tier, but gains power relative to tier 2 because of the increased competition among her
suppliers. In the end, her profits do not change much, as she is able to extract profits
from her tier 2 supplier (who suffers significant profit losses) and pass them on to the
monopolist, who naturally does better with the increased competitiveness in the chain.
Note that the profits of the previous (Figure 10a) case C firms do not change between
scenarios, since these prices are completely determined by supply-side competition and
independent of downstream prices. If c2k for each of these firms decreased all the way to
c1k, so that Δck = 0 (perfect competition), then these firms would make zero profit and
that entire subchain would supply goods at marginal cost to the downstream subchain. If
Δck = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ nT then the supply chain would feature perfect competition with
zero profit suppliers delivering product to the tier 0 monopolist, who would enjoy all the
surplus.
Varying competitive intensities and non-unique solutions
In the analysis of tandem monopolies we saw that loss of uniqueness was associated with a
disconnect between one transfer price pk and its neighbors (upstream pk+1 and/or down-
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stream pk−1). There a separation of the pk negotiations from upstream and/or downstream
prices occured only in the extreme cases (λk equal to 0 or 1), so complete (or zero) bar-
gaining power and price separations were synonymous and non-uniqueness occured only
when we had complete power downstream and no power upstream.
When bargaining power derives from horizontal competition we can have a separation
of pk from pk+1 or pk−1, or both, without complete bargaining power. For example, in
Figure 9 it can be seen that complete bargaining power by firm k holds in case C with
Δck+1 = c2k+1 − c1k+1 = 0, because then pk = pk+1 + c1k+1 so firm k extracts any possible
profit from firm k +1. Similary, firm k has zero bargaining power in case B with Δck = 0,
in which case firm k gives up all possible profit to firm k + 1. But we can have price
separations without complete power because whether or not Δck+1 = 0 in case C pk is
driven by supply side competition and will be independent of pk−1, and likewise in case
B pk is independent of pk+1. In either of these two cases we have a separation of the
profit flows, and drawing on our previous intuition we expect non-unique solutions if we
have case C downstream and case B upstream. But this can easily happen because the
tier 0 firm is assumed to be a monopolist, so with any viable competition in tier 1 we
automatically have case C for the price p0 negotiations. If there is another monopolist,
or a tier with very weak competition, anywhere upstream we would expect a non-unique
profit distributions along the chain. We will shortly demonstrate this with an example.
Also, when bargaining power is driven by horizontal competition the relative powers in
neighboring price negotiations are not independent of each other (in our tandem monopoly
terminology, λk cannot be adjusted independently of neighboring λ values). For example,
Δck+1 = 0 gives firm k bargaining power due to intense supply side competition, but also
implies that firm k+1 has little bargaining power in negotiations over pk+1. Intuitively, case
C in negotiations over pk will likely be accompanied by case B for negotiations over pk+1.
It is worthwhile for the tier 0 monopolist to consider the possibility of non-unique profit
distributions because none of the alternative solutions has a more compelling economic
justification than the others, yet the monopolist’s profits can vary signficantly among
them.
For example, consider the cost structure in Figure 11(a), where the total social surplus to
be bargained over is 20, and the second best firms in each tier are so inefficient that they
are irrelevant. Case A holds throughout and there is one unique BP solution with all firms
sharing the social surplus equally. In Figure 11(b) the second best firms in each tier (except
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tier 4) have greatly improved their operations and can potentially be competitive. We show
two feasible profit vectors for this case. In both of these, case B holds for negotiations
over p3 and case C for those over p4, and we expect either the tier 0 monopolist or the
strong tier 4 firm to enjoy high profits. This is demonstrated in the two BP-feasible
solutions shown. Managerially, and consistent with the intuition developed previously, the
tier 0 monopolist may be very pleased with her bargaining situation because she is getting
closely competitive quotes from her immediate tier 1 suppliers, giving her confidence that
she has found the market price for inputs and can do little better. But if there is a profit
bottleneck upstream because of a strong firm there, even if quite distant in the chain, the
tier 0 monopolist may be bargaining over a small fraction of the total available surplus.
Further, a remote bottleneck can alter the local surplus sufficiently to change the local
bargaining context (from case C to case A, for example, as local surplus is squeezed and
only the most efficient firms are viable). So, the upstream firm both reduces the surplus
available to the tier 0 firm and also reduces the degree of supply side competition that firm
can leverage forcing more sharing of the already reduced profits.
In those cases, there may be alternative feasible multi-echelon bargaining solutions that
are consistent with bargaining logic and could greatly benefit the tier 0 firm. If via a
supply chain audit the tier 0 monopolist recognizes this, she has at least two alternatives.
She could bargain more aggressively over p0, confident that as prices ripple back there is
plenty of surplus to cover her demands. Or, if possible, she could work to improve the
alternative supplier in the distant tier (tier 4 in Figure 11b), breaking the profit bottleneck
and enjoying higher profits as a result. For example, in Figure 11(c) when all inefficient
firms have value-adding costs of 15 the solution is unique with the tier 0 monopolist
enjoying profits equal to her best outcome among the non-uniqe examples in Figure 11(b).
If competing suppliers continue to improve operations throughout the chain so that each
tier beyond tier 0 features perfect competition (Δck = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ nT ) then as suggested
above that subchain will be comprised of zero-profit firms supplying a very profitable tier
0 monopolist (Figure 11d).
Consistency with business practice
In a series of conversations between supply chain managers and the author, most tier
0 respondents interviewed said they stay in close contact with and monitor their key
tier 1 suppliers, but have more limited visibility upstream. Some upstream integrity is
maintained by an approved vendor list (AVL) for tier 2 firms and some firms also take
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explicit steps to monitor upstream sources for key components (that is, firms use a mixed
model where they deal with their direct supplier but also with a few higher tier suppliers
of key, strategic components). But, it costs time and resources to maintain visibility
upstream so this effort is limited to differentiating components and key technologies. Why?
In addition to the overhead costs already mentioned, some firms said that their tier 1’s
understood and were better at navigating their local markets (where most low cost tier 2
and 3 suppliers will be located), so it is better to leave that in their hands. The decision to
scrutinize, or not, higher tiers in the supply chain is a rational risk/return trade off. Firms
carefully decide where they want to invest in upstream visibility based on a cost/benefit
calculation. It is no secret that the tier 0 firm can get hurt by leaving the management
of higher tier suppliers to others (one respondent described a situation where a higher
tier supplier made bad parts leading to a massive recall). So, there is some risk that
everybody recognizes. But, especially in longer chains, trying to continuously monitor
complete whole-chain performance would be infeasible or prohibitively expensive. Some
things have to be managed in a more decentralized fashion.
Asked specifically what would create a profit bottleneck upstream in the chain, and what
they could do about it, managers suggested that monopolists anywhere in the supply
chain will enjoy robust rents and cultivating a competitor to bid against the monopolist
will reduce these rents, consistent with the multi-tier BP solution. In a large energy
equipment company, it was recognized that a supplier two tiers away was enjoying very
high margins due to inefficient competition. The company worked to upgrade a second
supplier to compete with the primary supplier and drive prices down. Another division
in the same company chose to purchase a high-margin supplier to accomplish two things.
First, the supplier’s service (large-scale precision machining) was strategically critical and
purchasing the company secured supply. Second the supplier also supplied a competitor,
so purchasing it left the competitor with less competition among her suppliers (reducing
her profits).
Variable quantities with more than two tiers
The above results suggest no loss of efficiency in either two-tier supply chains negotiating
over price and quantity, or multi-tier chains negotiating over price only. In theory the logic
supporting this prediction (from any inefficient quantity all parties can move to an efficient
quantity and divide the extra surplus so all are strictly better off) remains operative
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even for long, complex supply chains. Practically, however, a thorough investigation of
the quantity-cost relationship for each potentially active firm in a long chain may be
unrealistically expensive in time and energy. This is a form of “bounded rationality” in
negotiatied outcomes that implies that all cost-quantity pairs may not be considered in
chain-wide negotiations. We expect these practical issues to be more serious the longer and
more complex the chain is. As an example of how complicated optimality can be, consider a
variable quantity model in which a tier features suppliers’ costs as shown in Figure 12. The
buyer facing these suppliers would experience a different competitive context at different
quantity levels. At low quantities the suppliers are very competitive and the buyer will
enjoy a lot of bargaining power in a case C situation (recall Figure 9). However, at higher
quantities there is a lot of cost separation between the suppliers and she is likely to be in
a case A situation of bilateral monopoly. Clearly, she might prefer lower quantities and
case C, although this may not be chain-wide efficient. That is, myopic preferences may
be contrary to chain-wide efficiency, so simple local explorations in contracting may miss
the globally efficiency quantity entirely. In Figure 12 the first supplier is always lower cost
(more efficient) and so will likely end up with the contract regardless of quantity, but in
more complex situations the cost curves may cross. Then, as quantities change different
firms can end up with the contract, further complicating the situation and increasing
the probability (in a boundedly rational world) that an inefficient firm ends up with the
contract.
The supply chain managers the author consulted for this paper generally described a
model of tier-wise negotiations over a prescribed quantity, and many professed to know
their immediate suppliers very well but had less knowledge of remote tiers. The tier-wise
bargaining model over a fixed quantity studied here is consistent with that testimony.
In those instances where quantity was not fixed, firms still did not explore the entire
quantity-cost curve. For example, one supply chain manager reported asking for tiered
pricing (asking for quotes at several different quantity levels) when they did not know
what quantities were appropriate. That is, they reduced the search to a few discrete
points. Analyzing the efficiency of the firms and quantities chosen when all costs and
revenues are quantity-dependent in long chains will require an extra level of complexity,




Theoretical models of bargaining with asymmetrical information have yet to reach a sat-
isfying level of representation. Information asymmetries are predominantly assumed to be
one-sided (only one agent in bilateral negotiations has private information). The unin-
formed partner is commonly designated the principal in a P-A setting, granted by assump-
tion the special priviledge of declaring the rules of the game by which the other parties
must play. It is assumed that all parties share the same beliefs about everybody else’s
valuation of the contract, an unlikely circumstance. A Baye’s Nash equilibrium solution
concept is invoked. Because of the way the principal must declare the rules of the game
to optimally overcome her information disadvantage, it is common for parties to wish to
re-open negotiations and change the outcome ex post. But, it is assumed they cannot do
this. Clearly this is not representative of most actual supply chain negotiations.
There is little laboratory evidence (that the author is aware of) about actual thoughts,
strategies and behaviors in bargaining with asymmetrical information. Anecdotal observa-
tions include deliberate attempts to influence others’ beliefs about one’s true valuation via
a variety of tactics (bluffing, or making the first offer to anchor the discussion at a desirable
point). Also, if a supplier really does not know anything about a buyer’s valuation, he
may adopt the cost-plus strategy of being satisfied to cover his costs plus a good margin,
without worrying too much about how much the buyer is making. There is a need for
more laboratory and field work to ground our models in realistic behaviors.
For all of its modeling deficiencies, however, the theoretical literature provides two qualita-
tive insights that have intuitive appeal and some empirical validity. The first is the notion
of “information rents,” meaning that information is power in bargaining and the lesser
informed party will likely give something up to the better informed party. The second
intuitive take-away is a potential loss of efficiency in bargaining with asymmetrical infor-
mation. The wrong firm may end up with the contract, or negotiations may fail to close
even in cases where surplus is available. Both of these conclusions (information as power
and an increased probability of failure to close a deal with asymmetrical information) have
some experimental support (c.f. Hagel and Roth 1995 and references there).
Here we briefly review the theoretical origins of these intuitive results, and present some
hypotheses and (speculative) conclusions for supply chain managers. Consider negotiations
between agents i and i + 1 in the chain, and define the value of the contract to agent i by
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vi = pi−1−ci (the net benefit for having the contract, so agent i will pay no more than this
sum to close the deal) and the value of the contract to agent i + 1 by vi+1 = pi+1 + ci+1
(the cost incurred by having the contract, so the negotiated price must at least equal this
value). Each agent knows her own valuation but is uncertain about the valuation of her
negotiating partner. In a complete information setting individually rational people will
close a deal if vi < vi+1, will not close if vi+1 > vi, and will be indifferent if vi = vi+1.
With incomplete information we hypothesize that there will exists a γi ≥ 0 such that trade
is likely to occur between agents i and i+1 if vi ≥ vi+1 +γi, but not otherwise. We further
hypothesize that for fixed real valuations γi will increase the more the supports of the two
agents’ beliefs intersect (the more uncertain the agents are about each other’s valuation).
If vi = vi+1 and information is complete we expect γi = 0, but with one-sided or mutual
uncertainty we expect γi > 0. What this means is that when the agents are unsure of each
other’s valuation, they may not trade even if in reality it is efficient to do so. For trade to
occur, the valuation of the buyer must exceed the valuation of the seller by at least γ.
This hypothesis is grounded in theoretical auction and bargaining models with asym-
metrical information. For example, it is well-known that in auctions with asymmetrical
information (c.f. Krishna 2002, Myerson 1981) the buyer optimizes her expected profit
by setting a “reservation price” above which she will not pay, and this is typically lower
than the highest possible valuation for the supplier, denying trade in some instances even
when ex-post both parties would have preferred to trade. An intuitive way to see this is
to consider two agents who have one and only one chance to submit sealed bids, and trade
occurs if and only if the bid from the buyer is higher than the bid from the seller. Neither
agent is likely to submit their true indifference point (which would guarantee them zero
utility) but will strike some tradeoff between their expected utility (with respect to their
beliefs about the other’s valuation) and the possibility that negotiations break down (c.f.
Chatterjee and Samuelson 1987 for such a model). While this one-shot sealed bid mecha-
nism is a poor model of actual bargaining situations, the intuition extends to more general
models. In fact, it is well-known (c.f. Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983, Muthoo 1999)
from bargaining theory that if the supports of the beliefs (of each agent about the other’s
valuation) intersect on a set of positive probability, then no possible ex-post efficient (that
is, trade occurs every time the valuations justify it) mechanism exists. Sometimes, trade
does not take place simply because of the information asymmetry and the self-interest of
each agent, regardless of which specific bargaining format one adopts.
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To understand the role of the proposed γ values more completely, and how they vary
with the beliefs of the agents, we briefly review some classical results in bargaining theory.
Consider any bargaining game, whether it is one-shot or alternating offers or anything
else, with a non-cooperative Baye’s Nash solution concept. From the Revelation Principle
(c.f. Myerson 1979) we know that we can replicate the outcomes (whether or not trade
occurs, and the transfer price if trade takes place) that can arise in any Baye’s Nash
equilibrium in the game by using an incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism
(rules of play) in which each agent has an incentive to report her true valuation into the
process. From Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) we know when trade will take place in
any such mechanism, making the results very general.
For example, suppose agent i believes agent i+1’s valuation is distributed over an compact
interval [aii+1, b
i
i+1] with distibution function F
i
i+1 and density f
i
i+1 (densities are assumed
positive over their support). A similar situation obtains for agent i + 1, who harbors











agent i + 1 by cvi+1(vi+1) = vi+1 +
F ii+1(vi+1)
fii+1(vi+1)
. These quantities are familiar from auction
and mechanism design theory. In the bargaining setting, Myerson and Satterthwaite show





[cvi(vi) − cvi+1(vi+1)]t(vi, vi+1)f i+1i (vi)f ii+1(vi+1)dvidvi+1 ≥ 0
where t(vi, vi+1) is the probability that trade occurs if the downstream agent has value vi
and the upstream has value vi+1 for the contract. As is now familiar in the mechanism
design literature, our natural intuition regarding what “should” happen is intact if we
replace actual valuations with virtual valuations. For example, in the above we might
choose to trade by setting t = 1 if and only if cvi ≥ cvi+1, ensuring the mechanism satsifies
the stated condition. Myerson and Satterthwaite go further to show that if the virtual
values are monotone and we want to adopt a mechanism that maximizes the expected
gains from trade, we do so by setting the above double integral to zero, and that this
can be accomplished using a probability of trade defined as follows. Let α be a number
between zero and one, and extend the notion of virtual values by defining
cvi+1(vi+1, α) = vi+1 + α
F ii+1(vi+1)
f ii+1(vi+1)






For any α we trade if and only if these adjusted virtual values suggest it. That is, set
t(vi, vi+1) = 1 if cvi(vi, α) − cvi+1(vi+1, α) ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. If we find an α ∈ [0, 1]
such that the above double integral is zero and set t as suggested, we have constructed the
trading portion of bargaining mechanism that maximizes the expected gains from trade
over all mechanisms. Note that using this construction, we trade if and only if
vi ≥ vi+1 + α

















) we trade if and only if vi ≥ vi+1 +γi. Hence, our
hypothesis is consistent with the most general theoretical results available for bargaining
processes under asymmetric information.
To make these concepts more concrete, let “b” (for “buyer”) denote the downstream agent
(agent i), and “s” (for “seller”) denote the upstream agent (agent i+1). Let U represent the
uniform distribution and suppose that vs ∼ U [as, bs] and vb ∼ U [ab, bb]. Then, cvs(vs, α) =
(1+α)vs −αas and cvb(vb, α) = (1+α)vb −αbb and we will trade if and only if vs ≤ vb −γ
where γ = α1+α (bb − as). So, vb must exceed vs by a margin that increases the greater the
span (bb − as) of the supports of the two belief distributions. This is the second part of
our hypothesis.
Tedious but straightforward calculus shows that the double integral above equals a cubic
equation in γ. Specifically, I = k3γ3 +k2γ2 +k1γ +k0 where k3−2/3; k2 = (3/2)(as − bb);
k1 = b2b −a2b −2as(bb −ab); and k0 = (1/3(b3b −a3b)− (1/2)(as + bb)(b2b −a2b)+asbb(bb −ab).
As α ranges over 0 to 1, γ ranges over 0 to (bb − as)/2 and we seek a zero of the cubic
equation in that range. If the supports of the belief sets intersect, this zero is unique. The
following table shows the unique γ for several uniform belief distributions:
as bs ab bb γ
0 1 0 1 .33
0 .8 .2 1 .30
0 .7 .3 1 .26
0 .6 .4 1 .23
As the intersection of the beliefs (bs − ab) becomes smaller, so does the required excess
of vb over vs for trade to occur. When the supports do not intersect (bs > ab) trade will
likely occur between rational actors.
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To see how trade may not occur and how parties can experience ex-post regret, it suffices
to consider the theoretical recommendation of acting on virtual values instead of actual
values (the latter being unknown). If a supplier is the principal in an auction, she optimizes
her expected revenues by granting the contract to the bidder with the highest virtual value,
which may not be the firm with the highest actual value (that is, an inefficient firm can win
the contract). If the highest virtual value is negative no trade occurs, even if the highest
actual value is positive (there are potential gains from trade).
What managerial recommendations flow from these hyotheses? With information asym-
metries, as the available surplus at any stage of the chain gets smaller the probability
increases that negotiations will fail. So, if any player in the chain extracts a lot of rent,
it leaves less to bargain over elsewhere in the chain and increases the chance of failed ne-
gotiations. That is, there are benefits for a more egalitarian distribution of profits in the
presence of information asymmetries. Whereas previously this was a natural consequence
of bargaining behaviors, here we see it may have benefits as a conscious strategic choice,
even for players with a lot of bargaining power to exploit.
These hypotheses are based on a principal-agent based theory that will not reduce to what
we know occurs as information gets better (that is, it converges to the empirically weak
P-A predictions as information becomes increasingly complete), and makes a number of
suspect assumptions en route. More work is required to know whether or not the existing
theory of economic exchange with asymmetrical information practically informs supply
chain bargaining contexts.
8. Other supply chain contexts
Assembly and category management
The applied context for our model was a firm developing a new product and initiating the
formation of a supply chain to bring it to market. The BP solution leverages the assump-
tions of a single active firm emerging in each tier, and transfer prices driven by horizontal
competition within each tier. Horizontal competition allows us to employ familiar non-
cooperative machinery in each tier’s subproblem, which are then balanced to generate the
prediction. It’s plausibility is enhanced by maximizing the familiar Nash social welfare
function, which occupies a central place in bargaining theiry. Hence, the BP solution can
be considered an extension of Nash bargaining into the complex territory of small numbers
supply chain negotiations among multiple strategic agents.
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Different supply contexts can suggest different models. For example, another common
context is a retailer stocking several brands of the same product class. The products are
partial substitutes in that consumers may perceive some differentiation among them, yet if
they find one brand stocked out they might choose another. The retailer will pay a whole-
sale price to each brand supplier in exchange for the delivery of some contracted quantity.
In the general case the efficient (consistent with an operations management perspective,
we interpret this as maximizing chain-wide profits and ignore consumer surplus) outcome
will include stocking some positive quantity of several different brands, so more than one
supplier must be active. Further, supplier 1 cannot compel supplier 2 to action without
supplier 2’s consent, and so no single supplier can make a unilateral proposal to the retailer
at the efficient solution. The retailer and supplier 1 still require supplier 2’s cooperation
to effect the efficient outcome. In contrast to the new product scenario with horizontal
competition, the consent of all parties is required to achieve efficiency and a greater degree
of within-tier cooperation is implied.
Another common supply setting is an assembly operation, in which input from each com-
ponent supplier is required to complete a finished product (the inputs are therefore pure
complements). In reality the tier 1 component suppliers are likely to be selected com-
petitively, as in the BP context. However, a pure form model in which all suppliers are
monopolists shares with the retail model the feature that the buyer and any single sup-
plier cannot, by themselves, achieve the efficient outcome. Again, the consent of all parties
is required, suggesting a semi-cooperative horizontal outcome. What sorts of solution
approaches are appropriate for these contexts?
One of the few results that has been robustly confirmed in the experimental record is
efficiency in small numbers bargaining with complete information. So, one approach is
to begin by assuming the efficient outcome and work on how the total surplus might be
allocated in the negotiated result. We will illustrate this approach with an example of a
retail category manager (R) wanting to stock three different brands of a product (Figure
13). The supplier of brand i is denoted by Si.
Let V denote the characteristic function for the cooperative supply chain game, so for
example V (B,S1) refers to the value that can be generated by a coalition consisting of
only the buyer and supplier 1 with no cooperation from any other supplier. We use
G = {B,S1, S2, S3} to represent the grand coalition of all players, so V (G) is the maximal
total profit available to the supply chain. Building on the existing experimental record, we
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assume that V (G) will be achieved and distributed among the three actors. The question
is, how will it be distributed?
As noted in section 4 notions of distributive justice (c.f. Guth 1988) can define focal points
for the parties in negotiations, suggesting an allocation of rewards based on how much value
each firm contributes to the whole. This intuitive concept can take on several mathematical
forms. In one, we might expect player i’s profit as a part of any coalition C to be non-
decreasing in the value they contribute to the coalition, ΔVi(C) = (V (C)−V (C−{i}))∨0.
One might also suspect that if ΔVi(G) ≥ ΔVj(G) then the final profits to player i should
be no less than those to player j. There are at least two solution concepts that satisfy
both of these criteria. One is the well-known Shapely value (Shapely 1953). The second,
newly defined here, will be referred to as the “Distributive Justice” or DJ allocation. The
DJ allocation predicts firm i’s profit to be proportional to ΔVi(G). That is, letting
T =
∑
j ΔVj(G) the predicted profit to player j is (ΔVj(G)/T ) × V (G). As yet no
experimental evidence exists to suggest which of these two, if either, is most predictive
of actual outcomes (except in bilateral monopoly where both reduce to a 50/50 split,
which has robust empirical support).
Both of these solution concepts have problems when mapped into managerial intuition.
For example, the Shapely value does not reduce to what one would naturally assume as
a solution in some special cases. Assume, for example, that supplier 3 actually destroys
value once products 1 and 2 are already being stocked. That is, brand 3 cannibalizes sales
from brands 1 and 2, but has lower margins. We would expect a rational category manager
to exclude supplier 3 from the solution. But, the Shapely value will grant supplier 3 some
fraction of the surplus. The reason is that the Shapely value grants allocations based on
an average over a firm’s contribution to any possible coalition, not just the one that will
be operative at the final solution. So, in this example, if the buyer and supplier 3 can
generate positive profits in isolation (if suppliers 1 and 2 are not present), then supplier 3
adds value to the coalition {R,S3} and will enjoy positive profits in the Shapely forecast.
Or, consider the perfect substitution case (where any supplier can supply full value so
V (B,S1) = V (B,S2) = V (B,S3) = V (G)). In that case, there is no reason for the buyer
to contract with more than one supplier, so one expects two suppliers to be closed out of
any profits. But, the Shapely value will grant all suppliers positive profits, for the same
reason described above. The problem, again, is that the Shapely value grants profits to
players based on their average contribution to all possible coalitions, not just those relevant
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to the actual solution, and so can give uncompetitive (and practially irrelevant) suppliers
positive profits.
However, the DJ allocation also has some questionable managerial implications. While
a value destroying supplier 3 will receive no profit, the DJ predicted profit to the buyer
(stocking products from the remaining two suppliers) is
V 2(G)
3V (G) − V (B,S1) − V (B,S2)
which (depending on how V (B,Sj) interacts with V (G)) can be decreasing with increases
V (B,S1) or V (B,S2) or both. Managerially, a retailer could lose money as a result of cost
reductions in the processes of the either supplier.
More work, theoretically and experimentally, is necessary for these supply contexts. Our
conclusion here is that the appropriate bargaining model may differ for different institu-
tional contexts. A thorough understanding of the institutional context is required to know
what can and cannot be assumed. That is, there is an operational anthropology step
prior to theory building, in which the context is understood sufficiently to build a credible
model of its behavior. Then, a theoretical model can be developed, analyzed and validated
with experimental or field data. Finally, the managerial consequences that follow from the
analysis can be fed back into real supply chains, forming a reciprocal and self-reinforcing
dynamic between theory and practice.
Other extensions
In general the loss of efficiency in supply relations can derive from
a) Potentially profitable negotiations fail to close
b) The wrong firms are placed under contract
c) The wrong quantity is selected
d) Delays are incurred reaching closure
Efficient outcomes can be expected in small numbers bargaining with complete informa-
tion, in contexts simple enough to allow a complete exploration of all possible outcomes.
We have already mentioned that we can lose efficiency in situations with incomplete or
asymmetrical information. We have also alluded (section 6) to a potential loss of efficiency
due to boundedly rational behaviors in complex situations (such as long supply chains with
different cost functions in each potential supplier in each tier). In fact, one suspects that
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these will be the two primary sources of inefficiency in real supply chains. More work is
needed to understand how to manage when both of these issues are present, but endoge-
nously so. That is, it is a conscious choice based on cost/benefit considerations to invest in
understanding (or not) cost structures throughout the chain, and information asymmetries
can be remedied with money and effort. More work is needed to know how to recognize
when problems exist somewhere in the chain, and what to do about it, using only available
information or that which can be garnered at practical cost.
9. Conclusions
We consider the supply chain context of a monopolist bringing a new product to market
through a multi-tier supply chain with horizontal competition among the several firms
in each tier. How does the chain form (which of the potential suppliers in each tier will
be active) and what is the resulting profit distribution throughout the chain? This pa-
per provides a previously unavailable answer to that question. En route we draw some
contrasts between the currently dominant principal-agent (P-A) paradigm and an alterna-
tive bargaining approach to supply chain analysis. The latter has more face validity as a
metaphor for real b-to-b negotiations and has an edge in empirical support as well, yet is
currently under-represented in the supply chain literature. This is an important distinc-
tion because the managerial recommendations following from P-A and bargaining models
can differ significantly. For example, with complete information the bargaining solution
will recommend that a buyer invest more energy in developing competing suppliers (rather
than investing in one’s direct supplier) relative to P-A models of the same competitive
context.
Historical supply chain papers have focused on efficiency and the contract forms that
support it. In the bargaining literature efficiency is naturally expected in small numbers
bargaining with complete information, an expectation that has robust empirical support.
Hence, the bargaining literature focuses primarily on the distribution of the surplus, and
tends to predict more egalitarian distributions of wealth than P-A models, as might be
expected when we do not grant any of the parties the extraordinary powers of a principal.
It is these different distributions of wealth that drive, in part, the different managerial im-
plications from the two approaches. Further experimental evidence is required to validate
or refute these, or alternative, supply chain models.
Given the way real supply chains form in practice, a key component for their analysis is
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the negotiations between two adjacent tiers, each with multiple competing firms. When
we solve this small-numbers bargaining problem, and then concatenate several two-tier
bargaining modules into a longer chain, we see several interesting outcomes. First, there
can be entire sections of the chain (likely the upstream firms) where profits are driven only
by the cost differential between the two most efficient firms in a tier and independent of the
prices or surplus available elsewhere in the chain. Second, there can be profit bottlenecks
that prevent profits from flowing to entire subchains. In that case, a firm may believe it
is very competent in its negotiations and is getting the best deal it can from its neighbors
(which it is), but all local firms can be bargaining over a greatly diminished potential
surplus because the majority has been siphoned away at a remote part of the chain. This
is important because in many applied supply chain contexts firms bargain closely and
carefully with their neighboring tiers, but have much less knowledge about remote tiers.
Yet, it may be at remote tiers that the major influences on their profits are exercised.
Future work includes the experimental validation (or refutation) of our proposed solution
(or alternatives, including non-cooperative and P-A models) for the sorts of small num-
bers bargaining situations found in supply chains, and the development and validation of
solution methods for other supply chain contexts beyond the new product context (for
example, assembly or category management situations). Finally, we should translate our
validated solutions into managerial recommendations for real supply chains.
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1: An equilibrium in the suppliers’ problem S→i will exist and all equilibria
will share the following attributes (j∗ denotes the selected supplier):
a) All suppliers j will bid πbij = (π
M
ij ∧ πM2s ) ∨ 0 and in particular πbij∗ = (0 ∨ πM2s ).
b) The buyer will choose an efficient supplier, j∗ ∈ E.











d) The contracted price and quantity are unique.
Proof: We will prove the proposition by proving the following two claims.




ij for all viable suppliers (π
M
ij ≥ 0).
Claim 2: For any viable supplier (πMij ≥ 0) no equilibrium can feature δij < 1 and πbij < πMij .






ij = 0 is feasible, so consider suppliers






ij and 0 < δij ≤ 1 then supplier j can maintain πbij (and
δ) but strictly increase πsij to π
M
ij − πbij and be strictly better off. So, this leaves the case




ij and δij = 0. If there is any possible alternative bid that attains
δij > 0 and does not give all profits away to the buyer, the supplier is strictly better off
so the status quo cannot be an equilibrium. If there is no possible bid that can raise δij
above zero, or none that can do so without bidding πbij = π
M
ij , then supplier j is indifferent
to any bid and by assumption sets πbij = π
M
ij . This proves claim 1, which proves part (c).
To prove claim 2, if πMij ≤ πbik for some competitive supplier k = j, then supplier j is
destined to be either uncompetitive or unprofitable, so is indifferent to any bid and will
bid πbij = π
M





competitive suppliers k = j yet πbij < πMij and δij < 1. Whether δij = 0 (supplier j is
currently outbid) or 0 < δij < 1 (supplier j is currently tied with others for the most
competitive bid), it is both feasible and strictly beneficial for supplier j to slightly exceed
the current bid, grabbing all of the business for himself (achieving δij = 1). This proves
claim 2.
To prove (a), if δij < 1 for all j then multiple firms tie for the most competitive bid. Since
in this case πbij = π
M
ij (claim 2) for all j, multiple suppliers tie for maximal π
M
ij . That is,
|E| > 1, so πM2s = πMi and for all j, πMij ≤ πMi = πM2s . Since all suppliers bid πMij ∨ 0
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this proves part (a) in the case δij < 1 for all j. If, alternatively, δij = 1 for some supplier
j, then all other suppliers k = j are bidding πbik = πMik ∨ 0 (Claim 2) the best of which is
πM2s ∨ 0. So, all firms k = j bid πbik = πMik ∨ 0 = (πMik ∧ πM2s ) ∨ 0 , proving (a) for firms
k = j. For supplier j to enjoy δij = 1 he must either be bidding πbij > πM2s ∨ 0 or be
bidding πbij = π
M2
s ∨ 0 and feature πMij > πM2s . In the latter case part (a) holds. In the
former case we must have πMij ≥ πbij > πM2s ∨0 and firm j can retain δij = 1 and be strictly
better off by reducing his bid to πM2s ∨ 0. So, πbij = πM2s ∨ 0 = (πMij ∧ πM2s ) ∨ 0 and again
part (a) holds.
To prove (b), we restrict attention to viable suppliers (πMij ≥ 0, of which there is at least
one by assumption). If δij < 1 for all suppliers j then πbij = π
M
ij for all j by claim 2. The
buyer selects from among the highest of these bids (suppliers in the set E), breaking ties
randomly, so (b) holds. If, in contrast, δij = 1 for some supplier j, then that supplier either





ij ) so either way supplier j is the uniquely most efficient supplier. This
proves part (b).
We have a unique price and quantity in equilibrium, because by assumption the quantity
achieving πsij∗ + π
b
ij∗ = ri(qij∗ ) − cj∗(qij∗ ) = πM is unique, and the unique price is pij∗ =
πsij∗ + cj∗(qij∗). QED
Proposition 3: The division of the surplus πM between an efficient buyer and supplier in
the BP solution maximizes the unconstrained bilateral Nash social welfare function with
supplier disagreement value ds = (0 ∨ πM2b ) and buyer disagrement value db = (0 ∨ πM2s ).
That is, the profit to the supplier, πs, will maximize (πs −ds)(πM −πs −db) and the profit
to the buyer will be πM − πs.
Proof: The Nash social welfare function with disagreement outcomes ds and db is (πb −
db)(πs−ds) = (πb−db)(πM −πb−ds) , which is strictly concave in πb with an unconstrained
maximum at πb = .5(πM − ds + db). This is the BP solution with the assumed default
values. QED
Proposition 4: In m× 1 supply chains:
a) If m = n = 1 (bilateral monopoly) the core is any nonegative division of the potential
social surplus πM between the two firms.
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b) If m > 1 (multiple suppliers and one buyer) let i∗ denote the sole buyer and j∗ (any one
of) the efficient supplier(s). The core is the set of allocations giving zero profit to suppliers
other than j∗, (πM2s ∨ 0) ≤ πi∗ ≤ πM , and πj∗ = πM − πi∗ . In particular if there are
multiple efficient suppliers (πM2s = πM ) then the only core allocation gives all surplus to
the buyer i∗.
c) The BP allocations are in the core and predict profits to each firm exactly in the middle
of its range of core values.
Proof: (a) There are only two firms, i∗ and j∗, so if πj∗ +πi∗ < πM the allocation cannot
be in the core. Hence, any core allocation is nonnegative and has πj∗ + πi∗ = πM . Going
the other way, note that {j∗}, {i∗}, and Cg = {j∗, i∗} are the only possible coalitions and
if πj∗ ≥ 0, πi∗ ≥ 0 and πj∗ + πi∗ = πM then πj∗ ≥ V ({j∗}) = 0, πi∗ ≥ V ({i∗}) = 0
and πi∗ + πj∗ = V (Cg) = πM so the allocation is in the core. To prove part (b), recall
that j∗ denotes any efficient supplier and any core allocation must satisfy πi∗ + πj∗ ≥
V ({i∗, j∗}) = πMi∗j∗ = πM , but of course πi∗ + πj∗ ≤ πM so together we must have
πi∗ + πj∗ = πM . That is, the entire available surplus πM must be allocated between
the two firms i∗ and j∗, leaving nothing for any other supplier (πj = 0 for any j = j∗).
But if for any j = j∗ we have (0 ∨ πMi∗j) > πi∗ then supplier j can offer buyer i∗ strictly
more than she is getting currently, and be strictly better (than zero) himself, instigating a
defection. The most competitive among suppliers j = j∗ can offer up to πM2s , so any core
allocation must have (πM2s ∨ 0) ≤ πi∗ ≤ πM , with πj∗ = πM − πi∗ . To go the other way,
assume an allocation satisfies these conditions. For any coalition containing both i∗ and
j∗, V (C) = πM =
∑
i,j∈C πi. If neither i
∗ nor j∗ are in C then V (C) = 0 =
∑
k∈C πk.
If only i∗ is in C but not j∗, then V (C) ≤ (πM2s ∨ 0). But since πj = 0 for j = j∗ and
πi∗ ≥ (πM2s ∨ 0), we have V (C) ≤ (πM2s ∨ 0) ≤
∑
k∈C πk. If only j
∗ and not i∗ is in C then
V (C) = 0 ≤ ∑k∈C πk. So, π is a core allocation. Part (c) follows directly from inspection.
QED
Proposition 5 preamble: Before proving the theorem we first describe the characteristic
functions used to define the cooperative game in the cases where there are multiple viable
buyers (n > 1). Consider the negotiations between tier 1 and the tier 0 monopolist in
the supply chain (an n × 1 bargaining chain). From Proposition 4(b) any core solution in
that negotiation game will feature an efficient supplier getting the contract and the tier
0 monopolist extracting rents up to the profit potential of working with the next best
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supplier. But, in negotiations with the monopolist the tier 1 “suppliers” represent a tier
1 - tier 2 subchain. This means that if tier 2 firm j∗ and tier 1 firm i∗ form an efficient
subchain to supply the tier 0 monopolist, then no alternative tier 1 - tier 2 subchain
completely disjoint from firms i∗ and j∗ can generate a strictly positive subchain value,
once we account for the price that has to be paid to the tier 0 monopolist. In our condensed
m × n notation, where the presence of the tier 0 monopolist is implicit in the net revenue
values (the r(q) values in Figure 4) for the tier 1 firms, this means that in a chain-wide
consistent bargaining solution, no pair of firms i and j completely disjoint from any efficient
pair i∗ and j∗ can feature πMij > 0. So in m × n systems with n > 1 any coalition C that
is completely disjoint from the set of potentially efficient firms must have V (C) = 0. This
is the only change we make in the characteristic function when n > 1. We first identify
the firms in either tier 1 or tier 2 that could potentially be part of an efficient pair. Any
coalition disjoint from that set has V (C) = 0. All other coalitions have values defined
as before, V (C) = maxi∈Cb(C);j∈Cs(C) π
M
ij .The proof of Proposition 5 assumes this revised
characteristic function.
Proposition 5: In m× n supply chains with n > 1:
a) If m = 1 (a single supplier j∗ and multiple potential buyers) the core is the set of
allocations with zero allocation to firms other than an efficient pair i∗ and j∗, where
(πM2b ∨ 0) ≤ πj∗ ≤ πM and πi∗ = πM − πj∗ . In particular if there are multiple efficient
buyers (πM2b = π
M ) then the only core allocation gives all surplus to the supplier.
b) In m × n systems, the core is the set of allocations with zero allocation to firms other
than an efficient pair i∗ and j∗,
(πM2s ∨ 0) ≤ πi∗ ≤ πM − (πM2b ∨ 0)
(πM2b ∨ 0) ≤ πj∗ ≤ πM − (πM2s ∨ 0)
and πj∗ + πi∗ = πM . In particular, if πM2s + πM2b > π
M the core is empty.
c) If the core exists the BP allocations are in the core and predict profits to each firm
exactly in the middle of its range of core values.
Proof: If j∗ and i∗ are an efficient supplier-buyer pair, and C = {i∗, j∗}, then V (C) = πM
and for any core allocation πM = V (C) ≤ πi∗ + πj∗ ≤ V (Cg) = πM , so we must have
πi∗ + πj∗ = πM in any core allocation. It follows that and no core allocation can give any
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profit to any firm other than an efficient pair. Also in any core allocation and any coalition
C we must have V (C) ≤ ∑k∈C πk. So, letting i be any buyer except i∗ we must have
πi + πj∗ ≥ V ({i, j∗}) = πMij∗ , or since πi = 0 for i = i∗ this implies that πj∗ ≥ πMij∗ for
all i = i∗. In particular πj∗ ≥ (πM2b ∨ 0). So, any core allocation must satisfy πi = 0 for
i = i∗, πj∗ ≥ (πM2b ∨0), and πi∗ +πj∗ = πM . Going the other way it can be confirmed that
any such allocation satisfies the conditions for core. With just one supplier (j∗ is the only
possible supplier) this suffices to prove part (a). For part (b) using the same argument
any core allocation must satisfy πi∗ + πj ≥ V ({i∗, j}) = πMi∗j for all j = j∗, so taking the
maximum over j = j∗ yields πi∗ ≥ (πM2s ∨ 0). These facts imply the stated conditions.
Going the other way, it can be directly verified that an allocation satisfying the conditions
also satisfies the definition of core. Allocating πj∗ ≥ πM2b and πi∗ ≥ πM2s is impossible
if πM2b + π
M2
s > π
M , so in that case the core is empty. Part (c) follows from inspection.
QED





is a VNM set, so in particular the BP allocation is always contained in a VNM
set.
Proof: Let j∗ and i∗ denote an efficient supplier-buyer pair. A BP allocation is always
contained in a set X = {π|πj∗ + πi∗ = πM}. No element of this set dominates any other
element of the set, because giving strictly more to the buyer means giving strictly less
to the supplier. So, we need to show that for any feasible allocation π′ /∈ X there exists



















j∗ + ε/2 features π
′′ ∈ X and π′′ C π′
for C = {i∗, j∗}. QED
Proposition 7: The following are equivalent:
a) There exists a unique bargaining solution.
b) There are exactly two recurrent classes in the bargaining matrix B.
c) There do not exist indices i and j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ nT − 1 such that λi = 1 and λj = 0.
Proof: We first prove that (a) ⇔ (b). The price vector p ∈ RnT +2 is a bargaining solution
if and only if it satisfies (I − B)p = C , < e−1, p >= r and < en, p >= crm. If there
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are only two recurrent classes, they must be the absorbing states −1 and nT . We know
(c.f. Puterman 1994, Appendix A) that if W refers to the submatrix of transitions among
transient states (in our case the submatrix of rows and columns corresponding to states 0
through nT − 1) then the nT × nT matrix (I − W ) is nonsingular. Since (I − B) is⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
λ0 − 1 1 −λ0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 λ1 − 1 1 −λ1 . . . 0 0 0
0
. . .
0 0 0 0 . . . λnT−1 − 1 1 −λnT−1
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
the nT × nT submatrix omitting the first and last row and column is nonsingular and
has full column rank. Let ξi denote these nT columns, indexed 0 through nT − 1 to be
consistent with the matrix B from which they were extracted. Since these columns are




(here 0 is the zero vector in RnT ), then all of the αi values must be identically zero. Clearly
the two rows of zeroes in the matrix (I − B) add nothing to the system of equations
(I − B)p = C and can be ignored. So, augmenting this system of equations with the
additional constraints < e−1, p >= r and < enT , p >= crm is equivalent to solving Zp = C̃
where Z is the (nT + 2) × (nT + 2) matrix⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
λ0 − 1 1 −λ0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 λ1 − 1 1 −λ1 . . . 0 0 0
0
. . .
0 0 0 0 . . . λnT−1 − 1 1 −λnT−1
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
and C̃ equals C with the first and last elements altered to r and crm, respectively, that is
C̃t = (r, λ0c1 − (1 − λ0)c0, λ1c2 − (1 − λ1)c1, . . .
λkck+1 − (1 − λk)ck, . . . λn−1cn − (1 − λn−1)cn−1, crm).
This will have one unique solution if Z is non-singular. To show this, let zi denote the





The structure of Z implies that β−1 = βnT = 0. But, that means that we must have∑nT−1
k=0 βkzk = 0. That is, a linear combination of the columns of the submatrix (I−W ) ∈
RnT×nT must be zero. But since we know W is nonsingular, this implies that β1 = β2 =
. . . βnT −1 = 0, so all of the β coefficients must be zero, meaning Z is nonsingular. This
completes the proof that if there are exactly two communicating classes in B, then there is
a unique bargaining solution. To prove the “only if” part of the proposition we know that
there are at least two communicating classes, so if there are not exactly two there must
be more than two. But, in that case we know that the matrix (I − B) has rank strictly
less than nT so augmenting that matrix with just two additional rows cannot bring the
rank up to nT + 2. Hence, there will be a multiplicity of solutions to the bargaining
problem. This completes the proof of (a) ⇔ (b). To show (b) ⇔ (c) it is apparent from
the structure of B that if all the λi’s are strictly between 0 and 1, then B will have exactly
two recurrent classes (absorbing states −1 and nT ). Also, B will always have at least these
two. So, B will have two recurrent classes if and only if we cannot add another class by
some configuration of 1’s and 0’s among the λ values. Note that λk = 1 implies a certain
transition from state k to state k + 1, and if the process starts at state k or above it is
trapped there. This is not a problem if all λj values for j > k are strictly greater than
zero, because entering state k or above just guarantees eventual absorption in state nT
and no recurrent class has been added. Likewise, λk = 0 implies a certain transition from
state k to state k − 1, and if the process starts at state k or below it is trapped there.
This is not a problem if all λi values for i < k are strictly less than one, because entering
state k or below just guarantees eventual absorption in state −1, and no recurrent class
has been added. The only way to add another recurrent class is if some λk = 1 (trapping
the process at k or above) and then we also have λj = 0 for some j > k (trapping the
process in state j or below). QED
Proposition 8: If the bargaining solution is unique, then the unique associated profit













Πk−1j=0 (1 − λj)
)
and the unique bargaining solution p ∈ RnT +2 can be generated from p−1 = r, pk =
pk−1 − ck − πk for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT . We define the product Πbj=aλj to equal to one if b < a.
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Proof: Define the set P = {p ∈ RnT +2|p−1 = r} and mapping π : P → RnT +1 defined by
πk(p) = pk−1 − ck − pk (0 ≤ k ≤ nT ) which is 1:1 with its inverse p(π) defined by p−1 = r,
pk(π) = pk−1(π)−ck−πk (0 ≤ k ≤ nT ). So, starting with a profit vector π defined as in the
proposition, the proof is complete if we show that p(π) is a bargaining solution, because by
uniqueness it is the only bargaining solution and the stated π is the unique associated profit
vector. p(π) will always satisfy p−1 = r, and from the form of p(π), pk = r−
∑k
j=0(cj +πj)
for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT . From the stated form for πk,
∑nT
k=0 πk = r −
∑nT
k=0 ck − crm, so pnT (π) =
r − ∑nTj=0 cj − ∑nTj=0 πj = r − ∑nTj=0 cj − (r − ∑nTj=0 cj − crm) = crm. It remains to show
that p(π) satisfies pk = λk(pk+1 + ck+1) + (1 − λk)(pk−1 − ck) for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT − 1, or
equivalently
pk = r −
k∑
j=0
(πj + cj) = λk(r −
k+1∑
j=0
(πj + cj) + ck+1) + (1 − λk)(r −
k−1∑
j=0
(πj + cj) − ck).
The right-hand-side of this expression is r − ck −
∑k−1
j=0 (πj + cj) − λk(πk + πk+1) so the
total equation reduces to showing that πk = λk(πk + πk+1). We prove the equivalent
λkπk+1 = (1−λk)πk . Substituting the proposed expressions for the profit into this equation
shows that it will hold if
λkβk+1 = (1 − λk)βk.










Πk−1j=0 (1 − λj)(1 − λk)
)
= βk(1 − λk). QED
Proposition 9: If there is available social surplus, that is if r −∑nTk=0 c1k − crm ≥ 0, then
a multi-echelon BP solution will exist.
Proof: Consider an alternative constraint set to the BP linear program, with c1k = c2k = ck
for k ≥ 1. If a solution exists in this case, it will exist in general because the constraint
set is relaxed as we increase c2k for any or all k (recall c
2
k ≥ c1k in the general case).
But, with c1k = c
2
k = ck the system of equations defining the BP solution reduces to
pk = 12{(pk+1+ck+1)∧(pk−1−ck)+(pk+1+ck+1)∨(pk−1−ck)} = 12(pk+1+ck+1+pk−1−ck)
for k = 1 to nT − 1, and the monopolist pays p0 = p1 + .5(c1 + c1) = p1 + c1. We need
to find a set of prices that satisfy these equations, and that give non-negative profits
to all firms. But, it can be directly verified that giving all of the surplus to firm 0 (so
p0 = crm +
∑nT
k=1 ck) and zero profits to all other firms (so pk = pk−1 − ck for 1 ≤ nT − 1)
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is a BP solution, and all firms make non-negative profits providing r−c0 ≥ crm +
∑nT
k=1 ck,
meaning there is non-negative total social surplus available. QED
Proposition 10: If Δck is decreasing in k then case B is impossible and the BP solution
is unique.
Proof: We first prove that if Δck is decreasing in k then case B is impossible. Case B
implies that r̃1 ≤ c̃2 and r̃2 ≥ c̃1. The first means that pk−1 − c1k ≤ pk+1 + c2k+1 and the
second that pk−1−c2k ≥ pk+1+c1k+1, which rearranged imply that c1k+1+c2k ≤ pk−1−pk+1 ≤
c1k + c
2




k ≤ c1k + c2k+1, or equivalently c2k − c1k ≤ c2k+1− c1k+1
if Δck = c2k − c1k is decreasing in k. So case B cannot occur. We now move to proving the
uniqueness of the BP solution when case B cannot occur. Let p ∈ RnT +2 and p′ ∈ RnT +2
be any two BP solutions with p′ = p. For any component k define Δpk = p′k − pk. Since
p′−1 = p−1 = r we have that |Δp−1| = 0. If |Δp0| > 0 let k = 0, and otherwise move
to k = 1, etc. until we reach a k with |Δpk| = ε > 0 and |Δpk−1| = 0. Such a k must
exist since p′ = p. We use this k to initiate an induction, needing only that for some k,
|Δpk| ≥ ε > 0 and |Δpk| ≥ |Δpk−1|. We now consider the feasible cases (A, C and D) and
show that for each the inductive hypothesis survives to tier k + 1. Considering the cases
in turn:
Case A: pk+1 = 2pk − pk−1 + c1k − c1k+1
Case C: pk+1 = pk − .5(c1k+1 + c2k+1)
Case D: pk+1 = 2pk − pk−1 + c1k − c2k+1
we have that if |Δpk| ≥ ε > 0 and |Δpk| ≥ |Δpk−1| then in cases A and D |Δpk+1| =
|2Δpk − Δpk−1| ≥ 2|Δpk| − |Δpk−1| ≥ |Δpk| ≥ ε > 0. In case C |Δpk+1| = |Δpk| ≥ ε > 0.
In any case the induction is complete, which means that we must have a strictly positive
change in all prices upstream of k. This is impossible, since pnT = crm is fixed, so no
p′ = p can exist, which completes the proof. QED
Corollary 10.1: If Δck is decreasing in k then there exists a kA such that the unique BP
solution is for the efficient firms in each tier to be active at transfer prices that generate
firm profits as follows:
a) πk = .5(c2k − c1k) for k > kA + 1, so profits are declining in k in that range.
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b) πk = 1kA+2
[
r −∑kA+1j=0 c1j − pkA+1] for 0 ≤ k ≤ kA + 1, so profits are equal for all firms
in that range.
c) The unique BP prices can be recovered from pnT = crm and pk = πk+1 + c1k+1 + pk+1
for 0 ≤ k ≤ nT − 1. Case C holds for pk negotiations when kA + 1 ≤ k ≤ nT − 1 (unless
this is vacuous) and case A holds for all other negotiations.
Proof:
We will use a series of preliminary results to construct the proof.
Preliminary result 1: If we define profits to be πk = .5(c2k − c1k) for k̂ ≤ k ≤ nT then for











j)] − crm, and for k̂ ≤ k ≤ nT − 1 these prices are BP-feasible for case C
negotiations.
Proof: πk = pk−1 − c1k − pk so pk−1 = πk + c1k + pk. Substituting the assumed πk for
k̂ ≤ k ≤ nT − 1 yields
pk−1 = .5(c2k − c1k) + c1k + pk
= .5(c2k − c1k) + c1k + πk+1 + c1k+1 + pk+1
= .5(c2k − c1k) + c1k + .5(c2k+1 − c1k+1) + c1k+1 + pk+1







So pk−1 − pk+1 = .5(c2k + c1k + c2k+1 + c1k+1). But because Δck is decreasing in k we have







k+1) ≤ .5(c1k + c2k+1 + c2k + c1k+1) = pk−1 − pk+1 = .5(c1k + c2k+1 +
c2k + c
1
k+1) ≤ .5(2c2k + 2c1k+1) = c2k + c1k+1.
Case C obtains when pk−1 − c1k ≥ pk+1 + c2k+1 and pk−1 − c2k ≤ pk+1 + c1k+1, which is
equivalent to the above two inequalities. So, as long as we define πk as described for tiers
k̂ ≤ k ≤ nT , case C will hold for negotiations over pk (k̂ ≤ k ≤ nT − 1), and the price
pk = c1k+1 + .5(c
2












j)] + crm is also
pre-ordained, but the negotiations over pk̂−1 need not be case C. QED.
If case C holds for negotiations over pk for k̂ ≤ k ≤ nT − 1, then pk̂−1 is pre-ordained
as shown above, and is the upstream claim on the the downstream subchain that begins
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at the market interface with revenues r and ends at tier kA + 1 = k̂ − 1. If that claim
is ever sufficiently large that all second-best firms in that downstream subchain (tiers
kA + 1, kA, ..., 1, 0) are not viable, then case A will hold for negotiations over pk for 0 ≤
k ≤ kA.
Preliminary result 2: If for some tier kA we are given pkA+1 and divide the total available
surplus for the chain from tier 0 to tier kA +1 equally among these firms, then if the equal
profits to each efficient firm, π̄, satisfies π̄ ≤ .5ΔckA+1 the assignment of prices and profits
on the subchain is BP-feasible with case A holding for negotiations over pk for 0 ≤ k ≤ kA.
Proof: Case A holds for negotiations over pk when pk−1 −pk+1 ≤ (c1k + c2k+1)∧ (c2k + c1k+1).
But by assumption Δck is decreasing in k, so c2k − c1k ≥ c2k+1 − c1k+1 or equivalently
c2k + c
1
k+1 ≥ c2k+1 + c1k, meaning that all we need for case A to hold is pk−1 − pk+1 ≤
(c2k+1 + c
1
k). Now if we are given pkA+1 and assume equal profits for firm kA + 1 and all
downstream firms, then each of these firms must enjoy profits of π̄ equal to an equal share










and the prices are then completely determined by pk−1 = 2π̄ + c1k + c
1
k+1 + pk+1 for
0 ≤ k ≤ kA + 1. If we can show these prices imply case A negotiations for each two-tier
module in that subchain, then the proof of the preliminary result is complete because case
A implies prices that divide the local surplus equally. But, that expression for the prices
is equivalent to pk−1 − pk+1 = 2π̄ + c1k + c1k+1 and to show case A holds we must show
that this is ≤ c2k+1 + c1k. So case A holds if 2π̄ + c1k + c1k+1 ≤ c2k+1 + c1k or equivalently
π̄ ≤ .5(c2k+1 − c1k+1) = .5Δck+1. It remains to show that if this inequality holds for kA + 1
it holds for all k ≤ kA +1, but that follows from the fact that Δck is decreasing in k. QED
Combining these results, we see that if case C holds for negotiations over pk for k̂ ≤
k ≤ nT − 1 then the price pk̂−1 is pre-ordained. If we set kA = k̂ − 2, and invoke the
second preliminary result, we see that if the drain pk̂−1 on the subchain from tiers 0 to
kA + 1 = k̂ − 1 is sufficiently large that π̄ ≤ .5Δck̂−1 then setting profits equal to π̄ on
that subchain is BP-feasible, with case A holding throughout the subchain. It remains to
show that the pre-ordained pk̂−1 = c
1
k̂
+ .5Δck̂ + pk̂ is BP-feasible for case C. Case C holds
if for negotiations over pk if
c1k + c
2
k+1 ≤ pk−1 − pk+1 ≤ c2k + c1k+1.
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Let k = k̂−1 = kA+1. Our construction implies that πk+1 = .5Δck+1 so pk = πk+1+c1k+1+
pk+1 = .5Δck+1 + c1k+1 + pk+1. Also, πk = π̄ so pk−1 = π̄ + c
1
k + pk. Together these imply
that pk−1 − pk+1 = π̄ + c1k + c1k+1 + .5Δck+1 = π̄ + c1k + .5c2k+1 + .5c1k+1. But, we also know
that at the transition stage .5Δck+1 ≤ π̄ ≤ .5Δck. Plugging in these bounds on π̄ reveals
that c2k+1 + c
1
k ≤ pk+1 − pk−1 ≤ .5(c2k + c1k + c2k+1 + c1k+1). So, case C holds for negotiations






k+1) ≤ c2k +c1k+1.
But, because Δck is decreasing in k, we have that c2k − c1k ≥ c2k+1 − c1k+1 or equivalently
c1k + c
2







Tier             Tier Tier




Tier             Tier Tier










Tier         Tier Tier Tier










Tier         Tier Tier Tier











Tier         Tier Tier Tier











Tier         Tier Tier Tier











Tier           Tier

















Tier           Tier

















Tier           Tier







































































Figure 6:  A two-tier bargaining unit embedded in a longer chain
1+k kTier:
n-1n i+1 i 1 0.  .  . .  .  .
Figure 7
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Non-unique solutions with 
firms 0-2 and 7-9 sharing Πtot
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Figure 10:  Example BP solutions
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Assembly or category management supply chain context
S3
